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ABSTRACT 
Despite efforts by the UN in the past two decades, the world has seen numerous 
intrastate conflicts emerge. Immediate worldwide reporting of such atrocities, evoking 
empathy for the plight of others, has led to an unseen measure of objection to repressive 
treatment, and the excuse of sovereignty as a defense against inhumane actions is being 
challenged. The relevance and importance of this topic is reflected in the origins of 
humanitarian intervention and the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty’s 2001 report titled The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the United 
Nations’ (UN) subsequent adoption of the report at the World Summit in 2005.  
This thesis uses the constructivist approach to norms and norm development to 
investigate whether a norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged in the international 
system that is shaping the behavior of states. It proposes that norms develop in a three-
stage life cycle. I suggest that the norm of humanitarian intervention, since the end of the 
Cold War, has developed in a manner that was initially consistent with the norm-life 
cycle, but more recently has deviated from the life cycle. This thesis seeks to explain why 
this is the case and discuss the implications of the norm of humanitarian intervention for 
international society. 
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I.   NORM EMERGENCE AND HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
In the current anarchical international system in which states are the single most 
important actors, the desire for an active promotion of forcible humanitarian intervention 
becomes a complex dilemma. In promoting a humanitarian foreign policy, to include the 
coercive use of force, states desiring to intervene for humanitarian reasons are given a 
fundamental choice between political autonomy on the one hand and human rights on the 
other—or more specifically between the sovereignty of the target state or the easing of 
suffering.1 These two issues—humanitarian rights and sovereignty—pose complex and 
contentious problems within contemporary international relations, and underline “the 
conflict between order and justice at its starkest.”2 
In international society, as Thomas Weiss notes “the cluster of norms inhibiting, if 
not prohibiting, humanitarian interventions includes nonintervention, state sovereignty, 
domestic jurisdiction, pacific settlement of disputes, nonuse of force, and, in the case of 
UN-authorized use of force, impartiality.”3 Weiss stresses “at the same time, a clear 
challenge to traditional interpretations of sovereignty emerges from the changing balance 
between states and people as the source of legitimacy and authority.”4  
The paramount international body governing the legal use of armed force in the 
international community is the United Nations (UN).5 For most international lawyers, the 
meaning of the UN Charter is apparent. However, as J. L. Holzgrefe suggests, “a small, 
                                                 
1 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Humanitarian Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of 
Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 136-37. 
2 Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), 227-28. 
3 Thomas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 
23. 
4 Ibid. 
5 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, ed. 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 37. 
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but growing, number of international legal scholars, beg to disagree.”6 Jon Mandle 
illustrates the two extremes in the debate of humanitarian intervention. At one extreme, 
some argue that “humanitarian intervention is justified when the likely benefits outweigh 
the likely costs, since when a state violates basic human rights, it loses its legitimacy and 
forfeits its claim to sovereignty.”7 Representing a strong form of cosmopolitanism, 
Mandle states that supporters of intervention believe “that humanitarian intervention is 
justified—indeed, required—if it is likely to result in a net decrease in human rights 
violations.”8 On the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that intervention is 
never justified, and who “make their case in terms of respect for state sovereignty as 
traditionally understood.”9 
This thesis seeks to investigate whether a norm of humanitarian intervention has 
emerged in the international system and if so, to what degree is the norm internalized in 
the international system, and to explain the implications of the norm of humanitarian 
intervention for international society. 
It is the growing, changing, and emerging pattern of norms—specifically the 
emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention—that this thesis aims to investigate. 
I argue that states always seek to legitimate their actions in terms of socially established 
norms, especially their use of force both internally and externally. It is the changing 
nature of what social norms legitimate the use of force, and whether they direct state 
behavior, that is under study here. The notion of constraint is “derived from constructivist 
understandings of how actors are embedded with a normative context structured by 
rules.”10 Norms are not physical barriers, but are constraining devices within the 
international community of legitimate practice.11 As Wheeler notes, “changing norms 
                                                 
6 Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate.”  
7 Jon Mandle, Global Justice (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 93. 
8 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.; Wheeler notes the key text on constructivism is Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
11 Ibid., 9. 
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provide actors with new legitimating reasons to justify actions.”12 However, the change 
in norms does not determine that an action (such as the new norm) will always take place. 
This thesis investigates whether a norm of humanitarian intervention has taken root and is 
shaping state behavior. The following sections of this chapter will discuss legal 
arguments for and against armed intervention and then presents an outline of the rest of 
the thesis. 
A. LEGITIMACY AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
International law is rather explicit concerning the use of force in the international 
system. Opponents of humanitarian intervention point to international law, Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter which asserts, “all Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”13 
Moreover, according to the UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, “no 
State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State.”14 Aside from that authorization by the UN 
Security Council, the only lawful use of force is one falling under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which declares “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”15 Humanitarian 
intervention such as in the case of Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999 do not, however, fall 
under either of these two categories. 
 
                                                 
12 Mandle, Global Justice; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
13 United Nations Charter, in Murphy, 143. For discussion of the legal prohibitions on the use of 
force, see also Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, “Changing the Rules about Rules: Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law,” in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. 
Holzgrefe and Keohane, 181; in Global Justice, ed. Mandle, 192-197. 
14 UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), 1965. 
15 United Nations Charter, in Murphy The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 
142. 
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Article 2(7) of the UN Charter seemingly prohibits the basis for humanitarian 
intervention, as it proclaims that, “nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter;” however, “this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”16 Chapter VII addresses action 
in respect to threats to international peace and security. Therefore, if grave violations of 
human rights can be characterized as a threat to international peace and security, then the 
UN Security Council can pass a Chapter VII resolution and decide the measures to be 
taken in order to solve the humanitarian issue.17  
Some argue that because of Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the use of force, and 
because there is not an explicit exception for humanitarian intervention, international law 
does not recognize the right of humanitarian intervention.18 However, as Christopher 
Greenwood points out, the UN Charter must be read in context, without ignoring the 
underlying principles of the United Nations—respect for human rights and “the dignity 
and worth of the human person.”19 
In this light, international human rights law has developed immensely since the 
Second World War and the writing of the UN Charter, including agreements such as the 
Genocide Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as 
well as regional instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, 
scholars such as Nicholas Wheeler and Martha Finnemore argue that international society 
has reached a point where a state’s violations of the human rights of its own population 
                                                 
16 United Nations Charter, in Murphy The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 
142. 
17 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 42. 
18 Oscar Schachter, “The Legality of Pro-democratic Invasion,” American Journal of International 
Law. 78 (1984): 646, by Byers and Chesterman, “Changing the Rules about Rules: Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention and the Future of International Law,” 177 and 181. 
19 Christopher Greenwood, “Humanitarian Intervention: the Case of Kosovo,” Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law (2000): 22. 
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are no longer considered an internal matter.20 Finnemore suggests this internal-external 
conundrum has become recognized in international institutions including the United 
Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation, and by 
the end of the 1990s, human rights were an indistinguishable part of international 
security.21 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FORCEFUL HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
Non-interventionists give three reasons against the use of military force for 
humanitarian intervention. Firstly, they emphasize that the rules of international society 
provide for order among states which have differing conceptions of justice. This view 
claims that intervention for humanitarian reasons will always be for the benefit of the 
intervening state’s national interest. Thomas Franck and Nicholas Rodley argue that a 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention will become a weapon of abuse that the strong will 
force upon the weak, and that intervention under the guise of human rights should not be 
permitted as a further exception to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter on the use of force.22 
Secondly, non-interventionists point to a dilemma in selectivity. What criteria 
should states or international organizations use to decide if humanitarian intervention is 
warranted? Franck and Rodley argue that a problem exists when an agreed moral 
principle is raised in more than one situation, such as Bosnia and Rwanda, but national 
interests or public interests dictate two different responses.23 Similar atrocities have not 
always received equal attention even when occurring in the same part of the world. For 
example, UN sanctioned humanitarian relief missions were carried out in Somalia, yet 
not in Rwanda. 
                                                 
20 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 51; Finnemore, The Purpose of Humanitarian Intervention, 79-80.  
21 Ibid., 135-36.  
22 Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force,” American Journal of International Law 67, no. 2 (1973), 290, by Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers, 30. 
23 Ibid., 288. 
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A third reason given as to why states should not intervene for humanitarian 
reasons is presented as a normative statement that nations have no need to risk the lives 
of their soldiers to save the lives of others. States including Western nations are not under 
any duty to intervene even if they have the capability to prevent or mitigate human 
suffering. Bhikhu Parekh in “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention” holds firm to his 
realist view and remarks that, “citizens are the exclusive responsibility of their state, and 
their state is entirely their own business. Citizens should be morally concerned only with 
the activities of their own state, and the latter is responsible to and for its citizens 
alone.”24  
C. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FORCEFUL HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
Andrew Mason and Nicholas Wheeler disagree with the arguments of the non-
interventionists. The authors state that non-interventionists:  
are unable to show that a properly regulated and suitably constrained 
practice of humanitarian intervention would be morally impermissible, or 
create a worse world that the one we currently live in . . . . [A]llowing 
humanitarian intervention in some cases . . . would promote overall well-
being. So far from forbidding humanitarian intervention, consequentialist 
reasoning will support it . . . .25 
Holzgrefe notes that international legal scholars who support humanitarian 
intervention by military force “advance three arguments aimed at reconciling 
humanitarian intervention with the UN’s jus ad bellum regime.”26  
Firstly, some legal scholars argue that article 2(4) of the UN Charter does not 
forbid the threat or use of force summarily. The Charter acts to prevent the use of force 
when directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.  
 
                                                 
24 Bikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” International Political Science Review 18, 
no. 1 (1997): 54, in Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 31. 
25 Andrew Mason and Nicholas Wheeler, “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” in The 
Ethical Dimensions of Global Change, ed. Barry Holden (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1996), 106, 
by Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 25. 
26 Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 37. 
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Fernando Teson states that if a “genuine humanitarian intervention does not result in 
territorial conquest or political subjugation, it is a distortion to argue that [intervention] is 
prohibited by article 2(4).27 
Secondly, Holzgrefe suggests that legal realists have argued in favor of 
humanitarian intervention in their interpretation of Charter’s requirement that states not 
use force “. . . in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations . 
. .” In their view, this statement “permits unauthorized humanitarian intervention where 
the Security Council fails to realize one of its chief purposes—the protection of human 
rights.”28 Furthermore, Holzgrefe notes that the security system of the UN—premised on 
a consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council—does not function 
as originally designed. Citing Michael Reisman, she argues that as a result part of the 
systematic justification for the theory of Article 2(4) has disappeared.29 According to this 
standpoint, “if the Security Council fails to end massive human rights violations, states 
may do so without authorization.”30 It is important to note that Holzgrefe qualifies this 
statement by noting that “its legal status depends in large measure on the international 
community’s current attitude towards such interventions.”31 
Thirdly, legal realists seek to legitimize humanitarian intervention by a more 
liberal interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter. Article 39 states that the Security 
Council may authorize the use of force in response to “any threat to the peace, breach of 
peace or act of aggression.”32 Legal realists argue that threats to international peace and 
security include internal state security, and hence an end to atrocities or human rights 
violations. This interpretation finds support in the UN Security Council’s actions and 
acquiescence, as “intervention in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), and Haiti (1994) all 
                                                 
27 Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Irvington-on-
Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997), 151. 
28 Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 39. 
29 W. Michael Reisman, “Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law,” Yale Journal of 
International Law 10 (1985): 279-80, by Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 39. 
30 Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 40. 
31 Ibid., 40. 
32 Article 39, UN Charter, by Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 40. 
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support the contention that the Security Council presently believes it is empowered under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize the use of military force to end massive 
human rights abuses.”33 Holzgrefe states: 
Humanitarian interventions in Liberia (1990), northern Iraq (1991), 
southern Iraq (1992), and Sierra Leone (1998) neither support nor 
undermine the proposition that the UN has a right to use military force to 
end massive human rights abuses. In all four cases, the Security Council 
acquiesced in, rather than formally authorized, the use of armed force to 
protect human rights.34  
Jane Stromseth suggests that the uncertain legal status of intervention provides 
“fertile ground for the gradual emergence of normative consensus, over time, based on 
practice and case-by-case decision-making.”35 Moreover, “widespread and systematic 
violations of human rights involving the loss of life (or threatened loss of life) on the 
largest scale are now well established as a matter of international concern.”36 Therefore, 
she argues, it is important to understand that the UN Charter and international law in 
general are not only about a single dominant principle of the prohibition of the use of 
force. The UN Charter is also about another equally important principle, promoting 
human rights: therefore, state sovereignty cannot always and in all cases be given priority 
over the respect for human rights.37 The following chapters of this thesis will investigate 
empirically whether such a normative consensus in favor of humanitarian intervention 
has emerged and taken root.  
                                                 
33 Article 39, UN Charter, by Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 41. 
34 Ibid.; Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 41; Holzgrefe cites Security Council 
Resolution 688, UNSCOR, 2982nd mtg., April 5, 1991; Security Council Resolution 788, UNSCOR, 
3138th mtg., November 19, 1992; Security Council Resolution 813, UNSCOR, 3187th mtg., March 26, 
1993; Security Council Resolution 1156, UNSCOR, 3861st mtg., March 16, 1998; Security Council 
Resolution 1162, UNSCOR, 3872nd mtg., April 17, 1998; Security Council Resolution 1181, UNSCOR, 
3902nd mtg., July 13, 1998. 
35 Jane Stromseth, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change,” in 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. Holzgrefe and Keohane, 233-34. 
36 Greenwood, “Humanitarian Intervention: the Case of Kosovo,” 12-13. 
37 Stromseth, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” 233-34. 
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D. AN EMERGING NORM OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? 
Finnemore argues that, in regards to humanitarian intervention, the nature of 
international order after the Cold War is still emerging. During the Cold War the 
“spheres-of-influence system was underpinned as a modus vivendi in large part by a 
willingness of strong states to decouple certain aspects of the internal behavior of states 
from assessments of the external threat they posed.”38 The dimension of internal 
governmental structures of states mattered little in a bipolar world of alliances. As 
alliances and spheres of influence were set between the two superpowers, “a relatively 
strong agreement [existed] that the way states treated their citizens was a domestic 
matter.”39 Furthermore, scholars emphasize that interference from other states was 
considered a significant violation of sovereignty.40 Finnemore argues that this is no 
longer the case: “states that abuse citizens in massive systematic ways are now viewed as 
security threats both because the flows of refugees and social tensions that such policies 
create are destabilizing to neighbors and because aggressive behavior internally is seen as 
an indicator of the capacity to behave aggressively externally.”41 
It is not clear that transboundary flows of refugees are requirements for 
humanitarian disasters to be termed threats to international peace and security. In the 
cases of intervention in Somalia and Rwanda, the UN Security Council Resolutions made 
reference to the “threat to international peace and security” but did not mention flows of 
refugees pouring across the borders of these two countries. For Somalia, the UN action 
was to support and protect food relief supplies and aid workers. In Rwanda, the UN 
Security Council Resolution 929 of June 1994 (after nearly one million Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus had been massacred) was aimed at ending the acts of genocide and 
aiding the estimated one and a half million internally displaced persons within Rwanda. 
In both cases, one benefit of the UN actions was to create conditions for the repatriation 
of refugees and the return of the internally displaced persons. Holzgrefe states that “no 
                                                 





impartial observer could conclude that the Security Council thought that it was only the 
transboundary effects of the Rwandan genocide, rather than the genocide itself, that 
permitted it to intervene.”42 The same can be argued for the Somali case. 
Many scholars posit that within the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention 
the “legality of intervention for humanitarian purposes currently rests upon the condition 
of the Security Council authorization.”43 The importance of multilateralism in the use of 
force has increased since the end of the Cold War. Referring to multilateralism, the 
International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report of 2001 
stated: 
There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations 
Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection 
purposes. The task is not to define alternatives to the Security Council as a 
source of authority, but to make the Council work better than it has.44 
Within the UN parameters, a declaration of threat to international peace and 
security coupled with multilateralism has attained a degree of legitimacy within 
international society, as exemplified by the clear case of territorial invasion by Iraq into 
Kuwait in 1991. Here the United States aggressively sought a multilateral response, 
through the UN, to the blatant violation of international law by Iraq. Finnemore argues, 
that “even in such a clear case of aggression when provocations were apparent and 
violations uncontested,” Washington’s efforts to build a multilateral force in conjunction 
with the UN “points to an even greater importance for multilateralism norms.”45 Mandle 
states that the difficulty of intervention “can sometimes be mitigated when the use of 
military force is authorized by what is seen to be a legitimate body (such as the UN 
                                                 
42 Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 42. 
43 Jennifer Welsh, “Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” in 
Humanitarian Intervention in International Relations, ed. Jennifer Welsh (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 57. 
44 “The Responsibility to Protect,” The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), xii. 
45 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 134. 
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Security Council) or a traditional ally, but it is exacerbated when the use of force is from 
a traditional adversary or when the intentions of the foreign power are questionable.”46 
However, not all scholars recognize the legitimacy of multilateralism and the UN 
Security Council. Henry Shue emphasizes that the Security Council is far from ideal as a 
legitimate body to determine the legal use of force apart from self defense. Shue argues 
that the UN Security Council is: 
outrageously undemocratic with vetoes in the hands of an odd assortment 
of five countries, all major powers fifty years ago but similar now mainly 
in being admitted nuclear powers, including a gargantuan dictatorship with 
pre-modern delusions about state sovereignty and two faded imperial 
powers with small populations and insignificant economies.47 
Such debate begs the question, which the remained of this study will investigate: 
is there a normative consensus on the legitimacy of UN-authorized armed intervention in 
a sovereign state for the purposes of relieving human suffering? 
E. THESIS ARGUMENT AND OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Despite efforts by the UN in the past two decades, the world has seen numerous 
intrastate conflicts emerge. Repressive treatment of a country’s own citizens by its 
government is certainly not a new phenomenon. However, immediate worldwide 
reporting of such atrocities, evoking empathy for the plight of others, has led to an unseen 
measure of objection to repressive treatment, and the excuse of sovereignty as a defense 
against inhumane actions is being challenged. 
The relevance and importance of this topic is reflected in the origins of 
humanitarian intervention and the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty’s 2001 report titled The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the United 
Nations’ (UN) subsequent adoption of the report at the World Summit in 2005. During a 
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speech to the UN General Assembly in April 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, 
“if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”48 Annan’s question 
describes the challenges being faced by the international community, and is arguably one 
of the most significant debates in contemporary international relations. As Kalevi Holsti 
reminds us, “the major problem of the contemporary society of states is no longer 
aggression, conquest and obliteration of states. It is, rather, the collapse of states, 
humanitarian emergencies, state terror against segments of local populations, civil wars 
of various types, and international terrorist organizations.”49 
This thesis will use the constructivist approach to norms and norm development to 
investigate whether a norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged in the international 
system that is shaping the behavior of states. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 
propose that norms develop in a three-stage life cycle.50 I suggest that the norm of 
humanitarian intervention has, since the end of the Cold War, developed in a manner 
which was initially consistent with the norm-life cycle described by Finnemore and 
Sikkink, but more recently has deviated from the life cycle. This thesis seeks to explain 
why this is the case and discuss the implications of the norm of humanitarian intervention 
for international society. 
The following chapters will identify why—despite the emergence of the norm of 
humanitarian intervention, the “tipping-point” of the Bosnian War, and its subsequent 
“norm cascade” during the NATO-sponsored and American-led war in Kosovo and the 
adoption of the principles of “sovereignty as a responsibility” by the 2005 UN World 
Summit Declaration—the Darfur crisis has been permitted to smolder for such a long  
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time without more aggressive intervention by international society. Lastly, the thesis will 
generate insight into the manner in which norms affect, and in turn are affected by the 
international system. 
Jutta Weldes suggests that norms are both developed through and demonstrated 
by a process of articulation.51 The next chapters will identify the various articulations that 
demonstrate the development of the norm of humanitarian intervention. They present 
empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that a norm of humanitarian intervention 
exists, and that the development of the norm was initially consistent with Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s norm life cycle, but more recently deviated from the life cycle. The thesis will 
then offer explanations for the deviation. 
Chapter II provides the theoretical foundation for the rest of the thesis. It contrasts 
neorealism theory and its arguments that states’ primary preoccupation is with survival 
and power in an anarchical system with the constructivist theory of international relations 
and its emphasis on norms, norm life cycles, and the question of how national interests, 
specifically in humanitarian intervention, come to be defined.52 The chapter describes 
how the process of articulation informs the emergence and entrenchment of an 
international norm, or a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity,” and can lead to the redefinition of national interests.53 Finnemore and Sikkink 
emphasize that norm entrepreneurs advance normative change through three stages of a 
life cycle—emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization—before a norm becomes 
ingrained into international society.54 Using Weldes’ process of articulation, I will 
investigate in later chapters whether a norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged 
through the norm-cascading phase and progressed into the internalization phase of the 
norm life cycle. 
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Chapter III will provide brief snapshots of instances of humanitarian intervention. 
Utilizing the work by Finnemore, it begins the historical snapshots in the nineteenth 
century to emphasize the change in the norm of who was to be protected or saved in 
humanitarian interventions.55 Emphasizing the work of Weiss and Wheeler, the snapshots 
will progress to examples of Cold War humanitarian interventions, specifically: India’s 
intervention in what is now Bangladesh; Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia; and 
Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda. Next, Chapter III will move to post-Cold War 
humanitarian intervention and provide snapshots of U.S. policy of humanitarian 
intervention from Iraq in 1991 to Kosovo in 1999. 
Chapters IV and V conduct an empirical investigation to demonstrate whether the 
development of the norm of humanitarian intervention has occurred. The data used in 
these chapters will include arguments in favor of and against humanitarian intervention 
presented by international organizations such as the UN, Africa Union (AU), and the 
European Union (EU). The data will also include the view of key leaders of the 
international organizations and member states to identified norm entrepreneurs.  
Chapter VI will look back at the adoption by the UN of the Responsibility to 
Protect principles at the 2005 World Summit. This analysis will shed some light on 
international society’s inaction in stopping the atrocities and to save those who are 
suffering in Darfur at the hands of the Sudanese government sponsored genocidal 
policies. The final chapter will include an analysis of the effect of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq on the norm of humanitarian intervention and R2P. The thesis will conclude with a 
discussion of possible further research that logically progresses from this work. 
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II.  CONSTRUCTIVISM, NORMS, NORM LIFE CYCLE, AND 
ARTICULATION 
A. GETTING TO CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Three S’s—statism, survival and self-help—represent three facets at the heart of 
the realist tradition that has generally dominated international relations since its 
emergence as a theory of international relations after World War I and have since 
encapsulated the primacy of national interests. Classical realists, represented by Hans 
Morgenthau, describe “the concept of interest defined in terms of power as the main 
signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international 
politics.”56 Yet this signpost gives little direction without understanding the mechanisms 
by which statesmen come to understand what constitutes power and threats to it. 
The oversimplification of the national interest as something objectively dictated 
by the state-centered, life-and-death, self-help nature of the international system became 
even more stark in the hands of the neorealists who dominated international relations in 
the 1980s. Kenneth Waltz writes, “to say that a country acts according to its national 
interests means that, having examined its security requirements, it tries to meet them.”57 
Waltz’s neorealism is based on a material structuralism that assumes that states’ actions 
are determined by insecurities that are inherent in the international environment. Thus, 
humanitarian intervention by the United States or a European nation to a country outside 
of the region or even at its distant periphery is the antithesis of the neorealist mantra.  
As many critics have since argued, such “neorealists models—however elegant or 
parsimonious—oversimplified their objects of analysis.”58 Alexander Wendt explains, 
“where neorealists and constructivist structuralisms really differ is in their assumptions 
about what structure is made of. Neorealists think it is made only of a distribution of 
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material capabilities, whereas constructivists think it is also made of social 
relationships.”59 These social constructions include national interest itself. As a broad 
array of scholars who have adopted an approach known as constructivism have argued, 
national interests are not objectively established but are constructed through social 
discourse. The validity of this insight is illustrated by dramatic foreign policy reversals in 
recent years, including the question of whether to intervene in Bosnia and how (or 
whether) to contain or change the regime in Iraq. As Jutta Weldes argues, “The ‘national 
interest’ is created as a meaningful object, out of shared meanings through which the 
world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is 
understood.”60 In subsequent chapters, the thesis will demonstrate how, through the 
process of articulation, and the repetition of phrases by domestic sources as well as 
leaders and institutions within international society—humanitarian intervention becomes 
part of the national interest. 
Social structures are not disembodied sets of ideas, but patterns of actual practice 
to which sets of beliefs and attitudes give rise. Wendt illustrates this point by reference to 
the Cold War when he states, “The Cold War was a structure of shared knowledge that 
governed great power relations for forty years, but once they stopped acting on this basis, 
it was ‘over’”.61 The Cold War was an actual cluster of practices and material 
circumstance and did not exist only in people’s imaginations; but when it was no longer 
going on in their heads, it was no longer going on in the real world either. When the 
Soviet Union ceased to be viewed as a strategic threat, the United States’ national 
interests shifted, even though the Soviet Union’s successor states retained all of the 
nuclear weapons that had previously menaced the West. In specifically explaining how 
national interests are socially constructed by a state, Weldes argues, “national interests, 
then, are social constructions that emerge out of a ubiquitous and unavoidable process of  
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representation through which meaning is created. In representing for themselves and 
others the situation in which the state finds itself, state officials have already constructed 
the national interest.”62 
The main constructivist argument charges that neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists cannot fully explain or recognize qualitative changes in states’ goals and 
preferences. These latter two theories assume that a state’s goals are determined solely by 
material self-interests. Laura Landbolt notes the power of the constructivist approach 
derives from its capacity to explain what the other theories cannot, specifically: “visible 
and wide-ranging shifts in the goals and behavior of states.”63 According to Finnemore, 
constructivists seek to answer the question: what kind of power, wealth, and security do 
states seek, and most importantly why do they seek them?64  
Christian Reus-Smit suggests that constructivists are divided between modernists 
and postmodernists; both, however, seek to “articulate and explore three core ontological 
propositions about social life, propositions which they claim illuminate more about world 
politics than rival rationalist assumptions.”65 Firstly, constructivists place normative or 
ideational structures as more important than material structures. Wendt argues that 
“material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of 
shared knowledge in which they are embedded.”66 Furthermore, constructivists underline 
the importance of normative structures because these structures shape the social identities 
of political actors and therefore, “the norms of the international system condition the 
social identity of the sovereign state.”67  
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Secondly, constructivists emphasize the understanding of the non-material 
structures of identity. Explained in a causal chain, an actor’s identity transforms interests 
and those interests can cause or change actions. Specifically, Wendt states “Identities are 
the basis of interests.”68 The more traditional rationalist theories are not interested in the 
normative structure of identity. These theories stress how actors strategically pursue 
material preferences usually for power and wealth. Constructivists, on the other hand, 
“argue that understanding how actors develop their interests is crucial to explaining a 
wide range of international political phenomenon that rationalists ignore or 
misunderstand.”69 
Thirdly, constructivists assert that agents (the state or individuals) and structures 
(global norms) are mutually constituted. Constitutive theorizing “seeks to establish 
conditions of possibility for objects or events by showing what they are made of and how 
they are organized.”70 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt illustrate this point with the 
master-slave relationship, stating “the nature and meaning of “master” and “slave” as 
modes of subjectivity are constituted by their relationship in the sense they cannot be 
“masters” and “slaves” except in relation to the other.”71 The institutionalized norms and 
ideas “define the meaning and identity of the individual actor and the pattern of 
appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals.”72 
Reus-Smit emphasizes yet another example, “the international norms that uphold liberal 
democracy as the dominant model of legitimate statehood, and which license intervention 
in the name of human rights and the promotion of free trade, only exist and persist 
because of the continued practices of liberal democratic states (and powerful non-state 
actors).”73  
                                                 
68 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 6, no. 2 (1992): 398. 
69 Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” 217. 
70 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in 
Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, et al. (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 58.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” 218. 
73 Ibid. 
 19
Wendt points out, “it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and 
instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our 
identities and interests.”74 Constructivism seeks to explore the independent causal role of 
norms and focuses on norm diffusion from the international to national policy level. 
Landolt notes, “The power of the constructivist approach derives from its capacity to 
explain what neorealists, neoliberals and realists cannot: visible and wide-ranging shifts 
in the goals and behavior of states.”75 Finnemore states that “constructivists examine 
similar action by dissimilar actors in the absence of constraint.”76  
B. NORMS 
The changing nature of the international system since the end of the Cold War has 
witnessed a normative shift in international security with an entrenchment of human 
rights regimes and the emergence of a concern for human security. Scholars note the 
human security paradigm has broadened the scope of security by widening the threats and 
deepened it by extending the referents of security beyond the traditional state-centric 
view to the individual and onto supranational groups.77 Constructivists argue that this 
shift in the normative framework of security and the change in referent object emphasizes 
a world of rising non-traditional actors, and non-conventional and transnational issues of 
concern. The emerging shift in the international norms of relationship between the power 
of the state and non-state actors in a globalizing world “leaves a clear message: the state 
is no longer able to monopolize the concept and practice of security.”78 
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The term “norm” is defined by Finnemore and Sikkink as “a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”79 Scholars recognize different 
types of norms. The most common distinction “is between regulative norms, which order 
and constrain behavior, and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or 
categories of action.”80 Finnemore and Sikkink note that it is the prescriptive quality of 
“oughtness” that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules and Annika Bjorkdahl 
emphasizes that an “element of repetitive action is often stressed as crucial to the 
formation of an international norm.”81 
While neorealism and neoliberalism have increasingly come to acknowledge the 
role of norms in the international system, neither theory gives much importance to their 
emergence, development and institutionalization. The realist paradigm suggests that 
norms are little more than opportune justifications for rational action in maximizing a 
state’s national interests. To neoliberals, the importance of norms includes the ability to 
make a state’s behavior more transparent and predictable in the international system. 
Jeffrey Checkel states, “neoliberal and regime theorists do accord a role to norms, it is 
limited: they facilitate cooperation among self-interested actors.”82 However, for 
constructivists, norms are social constructs within the international system, and unlike 
neorealists and neoliberals, constructivists hold the view that norms structure and shape 
the perception of what constitutes a state’s national interest.83 Neorealism and 
neoliberalism continue to emphasize state-centric approaches, for example the shifting 
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organizations, or the promotion of the spread of democracy. However, “such approaches 
prove inadequate in generating sufficient insight into the normative structure of the 
international system.”84 
Norm researchers, such as Finnemore and Sikkink, have made advances 
specifically because other paradigms have been unable or unwilling to provide 
satisfactory explanations for dilemmas in international relations.85 From a constructivist 
perspective, “the structure of the international system is determined by the international 
distribution of ideas, and shared ideas, expectations and beliefs about appropriate 
behavior are what gives the world structure, order and stability.”86 
Norms enable or constrain state behavior and therefore become integral to state 
calculations of interest and action.87 Scholars have demonstrated that the development of 
norms in the international system has come to affect state behavior. For example, 
Finnemore argues that norms have shaped behavior globally, regionally and domestically 
in regard to such issues as slavery, colonialism, women’s suffrage, poverty, and 
humanitarian intervention.88 Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that norms matter in the 
international system.89 
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C. NORM LIFE CYCLE 
As human rights norms have expanded, including those promoted by the United 
Nations and other international institutions, norms concerning intervention for 
humanitarian purposes have changed. Finnemore and Sikkink have illustrated the 
constructivist advancement that forms the theoretical rationale for the strategy of norm 
promotion.90 The authors emphasize that norm entrepreneurs advance normative change 
through three stages of the “norm life cycle”: norm emergence—where entrepreneurs 
persuade actors to support new norms; norm acceptance (or norm cascade)—where a 
large number of states or international institutions begin to accept the norms; and norm 
internalization—where norms become ingrained into international society.91 
In the first stage—norm emergence—norm entrepreneurs and norm brokers 
elevate and make known a particular problematic circumstance. This is meant to persuade 
actors, either states or international institutions, to take steps in accordance with their 
prescriptive recommendations. It is important to note that norms do not simply appear in 
the international system. Norms must be “actively built by agents having strong notions 
about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community.”92 Furthermore, norm 
entrepreneurs are essential for “norm emergence because they call attention to issues or 
even “create” issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”93 
Finnemore and Sikkink note that new norms do not emerge in a normative vacuum. 
Instead, norms “emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete 
with other norms and perceptions of interest.”94 Lastly, in the first stage, after norm 
entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to adopt a new norm, the norm has 
reached what he authors call a “tipping point” and the norm enters the second stage. 
The second stage—norm cascade—involves broad norm acceptance. It is 
characterized by a “dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other 
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states to become norm followers.”95 During the cascading phase, the norm will proceed 
through a process of international socialization. This process is intended to shift norm 
breakers into norm followers and finally into norm brokers. Over time, the norm becomes 
increasingly entrenched through socialization “by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new 
policies and laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international 
standards.”96 Finnemore and Sikkink argue that states comply with the second stage of 
the norm life cycle for reasons that relate to their identities as members of the 
international community. It is state identity that “fundamentally shapes state behavior, 
and that state identity is, in turn, shaped by the cultural-institutional context within which 
states act.”97 
In the third stage—norm internalization—norms become so entrenched they reach 
a “taken-for-granted” quality and are rarely questioned. Violations and punishment are 
widely supported by international mechanisms. Finnemore and Sikkink state that 
“internalized norms can be both extremely powerful (because behavior according to the 
norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously consider or 
discuss whether to conform).”98 Examples of such taken-for-granted norms include: 
market exchange, sovereignty, and individualism. 
D. ARTICULATION 
The process of articulation is integral to the emergence of norms. As mentioned in 
Chapter I, according to Weldes, “the term ‘articulation’ refers to the process through 
which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources.”99 
The meanings of words and phrases are created by establishing “chains of connotations”  
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and therefore, “different terms and ideas come to connote one another and thereby to be 
welded into associative chains.”100 Through articulation, these words and phrases 
become taken for granted within society and derive a particular meaning.  
Weldes emphasizes the process of articulation to explain how the national interest 
is fused together out of the realm of security. She argues that the national interest draws 
on numerous articulations. In the post-Cold War U.S., for example, “these linguistic 
elements included nouns such as ‘terrorist’ and ‘puppet,’ adjectives like ‘totalitarian’, 
‘expansionary’ and ‘defensive,’ metaphors like ‘the market’ or ‘dominos’ and analogies 
to ‘Munich’ or ‘Pearl Harbor’”.101 Weldes continues by explaining that the chosen use of 
the “language of the national interest furnishes the rules according to which these 
articulations are forged.” 102 In each of the terms mentioned, a specific and often negative 
connotation is subscribed to it. Through repetition, over time, these pairings can appear 
natural and part of common sense. 
Weldes uses the articulated phrases of Cold War terminology to exemplify her 
point. During the Cold War, the term “totalitarianism” was articulated to imply 
“expansion” and “aggression” and was further articulated with phrases such as “puppet of 
the Kremlin”  and “international communism.” Placed together, many phrases 
“constituted a particular representation of the international system.”103 Weldes argues 
that the process of articulation creates particular linguistic chains that have meanings, and 
in turn actions result from the articulated meanings. With their “successful repeated 
articulation, these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are necessarily 
connected and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, to be an accurate 
description of reality.”104 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink emphasize that the 
element of repetitive action is crucial to the formation of an international norm.105 
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Through the identification of the process of articulation, I will investigate in later 
chapters whether a norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged through the norm-
cascading phase and progressed into the internalization phase of the norm life cycle. 
Articulation has been contested, and the “contestability has two important 
consequences.”106 Firstly, articulations are not fixed, and to “prevent them from coming 
unglued, or from being forcibly pried apart, they have always to be reproduced and 
sometimes quite vigorously.”107 Secondly, articulations can be uncoupled. The linguistic 
terms can then be rearticulated to form a significant meaning. Weldes uses the example 
of “dissenters from U.S. orthodoxy, both from within and outside of the U.S.,” who she 
says have “persistently sought to disarticulate “the U.S.” from “freedom” and instead to 
couple “the U.S.” with “imperialism” and “aggression”.”108 If successful, this articulation 
builds a significantly different description of the international system—one in which “the 
U.S. does not exercise leadership in the global defense of freedom but instead exercises 
its self-interest in the imperial or neo-imperial expansion of its influence.”109 
E. CONCLUSION 
This second chapter has discussed the constructivist approach to international 
relations, illustrating the importance constructivists place on norms and Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s norm life cycle. The chapter demonstrated Weldes’ use of the process of 
articulation in the emergence of a norm. The next chapter will provide snapshots of 
examples of humanitarian interventions beginning in the nineteenth century. Subsequent 
chapters will use Weldes’ process of articulation to demonstrate the emergence of the 
norm of humanitarian intervention. 
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III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A CHRONOLOGICAL 
SET OF INTERVENTIONS 
This chapter will present three groups of examples of humanitarian intervention in 
chronological order: pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War. The purpose of these 
snapshots is to demonstrate the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention as 
described by scholars such as Finnemore, Wheeler, and Weiss.110 Each snapshot will 
focus upon events that pushed the norm forward, halted the norm, or effectively reversed 
the norm. In some cases, the norm of humanitarian intervention can be seen to have both 
progressed and have been halted during the same case. 
A. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Finnemore’s The Purpose of Intervention, emphasizes the incremental changes in 
international intervention since the nineteenth century.111 Her analysis begins with 
examples of Western European states intervening to collect debts rather than to support 
human rights. The norm in international society of collecting debt by force changed over 
time. Her emphasis on the change in the norm for the collection of debts is important to 
this study of the emergence of the contemporary norm of humanitarian intervention. 
In a very similar fashion to the changing norm of collecting foreign debt by force, 
Finnemore illustrates three cases of the use of force for humanitarian purposes by 
European powers in the nineteenth century. In each of the cases, European states used 
force to relieve fellow Christians suffering under persecution, primarily by the Muslim 
Ottoman Empire. Her study includes the Russian Empire coming to the aid of the 
Greeks—fellow Orthodox Christians—in their struggle for independence from Ottoman 
rule in the 1820s. Finnemore continues with the French expedition in 1860 to aid 
Maronite Christians in Lebanon and Syria. In 1877, the Russians again came to the aid of 
their fellow Orthodox Christians and used human rights abuses as justification for their 
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use of force. Lastly, Finnemore discusses a case of non-intervention. For more than 
twenty years—between 1894 and 1917—the Armenians suffered severe persecution from 
the Ottomans. Yet, “no European state used force on their behalf. Armenians were 
Christians, but as Monophysites, they were not in communion with any European 
churches, including the Russian Orthodox.”112 This thesis will continue by addressing 
one specific pre-Cold War case of humanitarian intervention—the case of Russian 
intervention in Greece. 
Each of the nineteenth century cases of intervention added momentum to the 
emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention. In considering Russian assistance to 
the Greeks in the 1820s, Finnemore makes three observations about humanitarian 
intervention norms. First, the case illustrates the “circumscribed definition of who was 
‘human’ in the nineteenth-century conception.”113 Specifically, she notes the atrocities 
committed by both the Greeks and the Ottomans. However, atrocities committed against 
Christians were considered by the European powers to be a humanitarian disaster while 
massacring Muslims was not. Second, though the intervention primarily came from 
Russia, other countries provided assistance suggesting a need for multilateralism. But the 
multilateral intervention is noted to have been for geostrategic reasons—specifically, to 
restrain any Russian temptation from moving past the humanitarian intentions of the 
intervention. However, as subsequent cases will show, “multilateralism as a characteristic 
of legitimate intervention becomes increasingly important” although for different 
reasons.114 Third, as was expected in the norm entrepreneur and norm cascade cycles of 
the norm life cycle (in Chapter II), Finnemore stresses that public reaction and public 
opinion mattered. She states:  
Not only did public opinion influence policy making in a diffuse way, but 
publics were organized transnationally in ways that strongly foreshadow 
humanitarian activity by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
late twentieth century. 
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Gary Bass emphasizes that the London Greek Committee was determined to do more 
than just rally public opinion. This organization wanted to defend the Greeks by armed 
intervention and “unlike Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, this was an 
organization with an active military subcommittee.”115 Bass describes the London Greek 
Committee as radical, as “to them Ottoman sovereignty scarcely mattered, any more than 
Serbian sovereignty would matter to liberals as Milosevic scourged Kosovo in 1999.”116 
The identification of nineteenth century efforts by European powers to stop 
incredible atrocities by intervening with military force is instrumental to this study’s 
understanding of the roots of the norm of humanitarian intervention in the twenty-first 
century. The four interventions discussed by Finnemore illustrate the emergence of the 
norm—albeit with a dose of geostrategic emphasis as well—of humanitarian intervention 
to save the lives of fellow Christians. Finnemore’s work continues to demonstrate the 
evolution of the norm of intervention, and the fact that by the “end of the twentieth 
century, most of the protected populations were non-white, non-Christian groups.”117  
B. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE COLD WAR 
Due to the bipolarity of the Cold War, instances of humanitarian intervention 
from 1945 to 1989, though grounded in humanitarian intent, were primarily unilateral in 
operation and best explained through the lens of security. Briefly investigating three 
interventions provides the basis for a comparative understanding and analysis of post-
Cold War cases of intervention.118 Wheeler states that the “legitimating reasons 
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arguing that legitimacy is constitutive of state actions, Wheeler stresses that “state actions 
will be constrained if they cannot be justified in terms of plausible legitimating 
reason.”120  
The three primary cases of unilateral intervention with humanitarian bases during 
the Cold War are India’s use of armed force to stop the atrocities in East Pakistan in 
1971; Vietnam’s defeat of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia in 1979; and Tanzania’s 
overthrow of Idi Amin’s brutal regime in Uganda in 1979. This chapter will focus on one 
specific Cold War case of humanitarian intervention—the case of Indian intervention in 
East Pakistan. 
Since the independence and partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, Pakistan 
had been divided into West and East Pakistan, both ruled from Islamabad. In March of 
1971, political unrest, due to the lack of adequate representation and voice in the National 
Assembly, erupted in East Pakistan. Without warning “the West Pakistani army started 
killing unarmed civilians indiscriminately, raping women, burning homes, and looting or 
destroying property.”121 At least one million people were killed and an estimated nine to 
ten million refugees fled across the border into West Bengal, India.  
Wheeler starkly notes that “in the face of mass killing in East Pakistan, the 
overwhelming reaction of the society of states was to affirm Pakistan’s right to 
sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention.”122 He further notes the Cold War 
bipolarity, with the U.S. and China aligned with Pakistan and the Soviet Union 
supporting India. This presence of two opposing camps within the UN Security Council 
prevented effective pressure being placed upon Pakistan to end the growing conflict.123 
Following what Finnemore describes as months of tension, border skirmishes, and 
increased pressure due to the vast flow of refugees—and before the indecisive Security  
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Council decided to act—India deployed troops to East Pakistan. After just twelve days of 
fighting the Pakistani army surrendered at Dacca, and “thereby enabled the birth of an 
independent Bangladesh.”124 
Initially, the Indian delegation to the UN articulated humanitarian grounds for 
their justification of intervention to support the Bangladeshis.125 This claim was rejected 
by a varied group of states including the United States, Argentina, Tunisia, China, and 
Saudi Arabia. These countries argued “that principles of sovereignty and noninterference 
should take precedence and that India had no right to meddle in what they all viewed as 
an internal matter.”126 In response, the Indian delegation retracted all statements to the 
effect of humanitarianism, and India “justified its action as lawful self-defense against the 
floods of refugees unleashed by Pakistan’s brutality.”127 Ambassador Sen argued that 
Pakistan had committed a new crime of “refugee aggression.” and asserted that “the 
meaning of ‘aggression’ should also encompass the aggression that resulted from ten 
million people coming into India as refugees.”128 Wheeler quotes Ambassador Sen 
saying: 
Now, was that not a kind of aggression? If aggression against another 
foreign country means that it strains its social structure, that it ruins its 
finances, that it has to give up its territory for sheltering the refugees . . . 
what is the difference between that kind of aggression and the other type, 
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India’s initial justification for intervention under humanitarian grounds is 
significant. This was the first time during the Cold War that such claims, even if 
eventually revoked, were presented to the UN to justify the use of force. Wheeler notes, 
“by invoking global humanitarian norms in its defense, India appealed for its use of force 
to be treated as an exceptional case.”130 
The Cold War notion that humanitarian reasons alone do not justify intervention, 
as exemplified in the justifications given by states to legitimate their actions, are crucial 
because these legitimating reasons enable and constrain actions. The Indian, Vietnamese, 
and Tanzanian cases of intervention during the Cold War are similar in that the 
governments could have justified their use of force under humanitarian grounds. 
Therefore, proponents of armed humanitarian intervention such as Wheeler argue that 
“India’s, Vietnam’s and Tanzania’s actions were all justifiable because the use of force 
was the only means of ending atrocities on a massive scale, and the motives/means 
employed were consistent with a positive humanitarian outcome.”131  
From a humanitarian perspective, the most promising difference between the 
cases of intervention by India, Vietnam, and Tanzania and the post-Cold War cases 
discussed in the next section of this chapter is the emphasis on the requirement of 
multilateralism for the intervention to be considered legitimate by international society. 
This is due primarily but not entirely to the removal of the threat of superpower war. In 
all the cases below, save Kosovo, UN Security Council authorization was granted. Before 
the end of the Cold War, Hedley Bull noted the era of increased attention to human rights 
and an increased focus on the UN was bound to see a resurgence of principles of 
humanitarian intervention. Bull stated, “ultimately, we have a rule of non-intervention 
because unilateral intervention threatens the harmony and concord of the society of 
sovereign states.” Bull continues, “if, however, an intervention itself expresses the 
collective will of the society of states, it may be carried out without bringing that  
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harmony and concord into jeopardy.”132 Some might wonder if Bull had a U.S.-led and 
NATO-sponsored humanitarian operation such as Kosovo—that did not receive a tacit 
UN Security Council authorization—in mind. 
C. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FROM IRAQ IN 1991 TO KOSOVO 
IN 1999 
The end of the bipolar world allowed for numerous large-scale interventions to be 
carried out claiming humanitarian justifications as their rational. Addressing the post-
Cold War interventions, Finnemore states, “although these efforts have attracted varying 
amounts of criticism concerning their effectiveness, their legitimacy has received little or 
no criticism.”133 It is important to this study of the norm emergence of humanitarian 
intervention to understand the normative shift in the determination of the legitimate use 
of armed intervention for humanitarian purposes within international society. 
1. Iraq 
Saddam Hussein responded to uprisings in the Kurdish north and Shiite south in 
Iraq with brutal campaigns of suppression in clear violation of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention on armed conflict and other human rights agreements.134 This resulted in 
hundreds of thousand of refugees in Iraq whose plight, especially the Kurds in the north, 
attracted special international attention. The UN Security Council responded with the 
adoption of Resolution 688 in April of 1991 condemning “the repression of the Iraqi 
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areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security.”135 The 
resolution demanded that Iraq end the repression “as a contribution to removing the threat 
to international peace and security in the region.”136 
Resolution 688 was groundbreaking as it identified a humanitarian crisis and a 
state’s mistreatment of its own nationals as a threat to international peace and security, 
thus pushing aside the formerly established norm of non-intervention and thus pushing 
forward the boundaries of international law.137 Even though it was not a Chapter VII 
resolution calling for enforcement, the U.S., the UK, and several other countries sent 
military forces to northern Iraq in order to create “safe havens” for the Kurdish refugees 
and created no-fly-zones with aircraft patrolling over Iraq. The UN Security Council 
received international criticism because the safe havens were not specifically authorized 
in Resolution 688.138  
Two members of the UN Security Council, one permanent (China) and one non-
permanent (India) abstained in the vote to approve Resolution 688, because, it can be 
suggested, of minority ethnic populations within their own sovereign borders. China and 
India deemed the UN action a gradual global political attempt to chip away at the 
Westphalian sovereign state system.139 Iraq’s ambassador to the UN argued that 
Resolution 688 was a violation of Article 2 of the UN Charter because it sanctioned 
interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. The Yemeni Ambassador argued that the 
humanitarian crisis inside of Iraq did not pose a threat to international peace and security 
and “the whole issue is not within the competence of the Security Council.”140 
One can easily conclude that the Western powers rightfully undertook 
humanitarian intervention in Iraq in 1991. However, Mayall suggests that action was only 
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taken “because the attention devoted by the Western media to the plight of the Kurds 
threatened the political dividends Western governments had secured from their conduct 
of the war itself.”141 Nonetheless, the safe havens created by the UN and the elimination 
of the remnants of the Iraqi Army wreaking havoc on the Kurdish refugees did ease their 
suffering.  
2. Somalia 
In the UN intervention in Somalia in 1992, President George H. W. Bush did not 
intend to send troops until there was overwhelming pressure from Americans and the 
international community.142 The U.S. deployed over thirty thousand soldiers to help 
secure the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia. The manner in which that force was 
used created an environment in which the antagonisms between the UN and local 
warlords grew, and internal security was further undermined as U.S. troops were not seen 
as impartial. The situation moved from an international response to a humanitarian crisis, 
where large amounts of emergency food aid and medicine were delivered, to a situation 
in which the troops who had been sent to distribute that material became targets, as 
without armed protection of food convoys, significant amounts were looted by warlords 
and failed to reach the intended recipients.  
The humanitarian intervention in Somalia was “unprecedented in UN history” 
because Resolution 814 “authorized UN forces under Chapter VII to use force to 
implement its mandate.”143 Chapter VII was used because the country was in such a state 
of anarchy and chaos that there did not exist a government to ask for a formal invitation 
to intervene.144 Under the Chapter VII mandate, the stated goals of the intervention were 
twofold. The first goal was to distribute food to the starving population without the 
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warlords ceasing the foodstuff and using them for their own political goals.145 The 
second goal of the Bush Administration in its humanitarian efforts in Somalia was to 
bring order and to disarm the lawless country. Disarmament and the capture of warlords 
that were interfering with the distribution of food later led to U.S. air attacks on arms 
caches and against clan leadership.146 This culminated in the battle of Mogadishu with 
nineteen U.S. Rangers killed in action. President Clinton responded by “accelerating their 
departure, and the United Nations suspended the mission in the spring of 1995.”147 
The intervention and the Battle of Mogadishu had significant secondary effects, as 
we will see in the next sections on Rwanda and Bosnia. The norm of humanitarian 
intervention made significant strides within the UN as exemplified by the Chapter VII 
mandate. However, the media broadcast of the Somalis—those whom the UN blue-
helmeted soldiers came to save—chanting “Down with the U.S., down with the UN” 
served as a vivid reminder to the UN and the countries that had provided troops that 
humanitarian intervention is a complex mission. 
3. Rwanda 
As the unsuccessful UN intervention in Somalia was ending, “the world was 
confronted with an even more grotesque humanitarian nightmare in the African state of 
Rwanda.”148 From 6 April through to mid-July 1994—less than three months—an 
estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in a genocidal terror instigated by Hutu 
extremists against the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus. 
The United Nations, having just failed to provide relief effectively in Somalia 
considered “a concerted peacekeeping effort in Rwanda was out of the question,” and 
shamefully the UN fell silent in the face of the growing tragedy as no one wanted to cross 
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“the Mogadishu-line.”149 In an article discussing U.S. national interests, Nye states that 
“one of the direct effects of the Somalia disaster was America’s failure (along with other 
countries) to support and reinforce the United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda that 
could have limited a true genocide.”150 
In late 1993, the UN sent in a small force to oversee a ceasefire between the 
Rwandan government’s military forces and the forces of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF). Rather than enlarge the number of troops being used to protect 
foreign nationals and thousands of Rwandans in hiding, the UN made the tragic decision 
to withdraw its forces. This decision “condemned the Rwandans to their fate.”151 Under 
what one author describes as “a cloak of self-interest,” the UN Security Council 
authorized the French to intervene by sending troops to protect the refugees.152 This 
resolution was under Chapter VII of the Charter and responded to the growing threat to 
international peace and security from the “internal displacement” of 1.5 million 
Rwandans, primarily at the borders of neighboring countries.153 Wheeler argues, “the 
point is not that lives were saved but that more lives could have been saved had France 
selected military means that were appropriate to its humanitarian claims.”154 
The paralysis of the UN to act in a timely matter emphasizes the difficulty of the 
norm of humanitarian intervention as it competes with other state interests. However, 
Finnemore notes that “the episode also reveals something about the normative terrain on 
which these interventions are debated.”155 In contrast to the instances of humanitarian 
intervention during the bipolar tensions of the Cold War, “no significant constituency 
was claiming that intervention in Rwanda for humanitarian purposes would have been 
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illegitimate or an illegal breach of sovereignty.”156 Finnemore emphasizes a “shift in the 
normative burdens to act” produced by the case of Rwanda. Afterwards, “states 
understood that they had not just a right but a duty to intervene. That the Americans 
apologized substantiates this.”157  
4. Bosnia 
Before the Somalia debacle was over and just before the Rwandan genocide of 
1994, a further crisis in Bosnia gained international attention. American politicians did 
not have the stomach to, and could not at that time, justify sending more troops into 
harms’ way to save strangers. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger made the 
following statement: 
But the fact of the matter is that a thousand people are starving to death 
every day, and this is not going to get better if we don’t do something 
about it, and it is in an area where we can affect events. There are other 
parts of the world where things are equally tragic, but where the cost of 
trying to change things would be monumental. In my view, Bosnia is one 
of those.158 
The most significant figure in the demise of the Yugoslav ideal was Slobodan 
Milosevic, the Serbian president. After taking power in 1987, he began forging alliances 
with other Serbian nationalists who dreamed of a “Greater Serbia.” Milosevic’s central 
concerns from 1992-95 were how much of Bosnia to annex in the face of growing 
international criticism and hostility, and on the other hand, the “success of Bosnian Serbs, 
whose calculations and ambitions might not accord with his own.”159 
The creation of safe areas by the UN Security Council Resolution 819 in April 
1993 represented an important departure for UN involvement and a continuing normative 
shift in humanitarian intervention. Before this critical step, the UN had purposely limited 
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itself to providing humanitarian aid. For the first time “the international community had 
committed itself—morally, if not in any effective practical sense—to the protection of 
one side in the war against another.”160 The UN Security Council Resolution 819 did not 
provide the protection it offered but aligned the UN with one side in the conflict. This 
was the single biggest step down the path by Western nations who had vowed not to 
take—“the path by which they would be drawn into the conflict in a series of unplanned, 
unthought-out, and incremental steps.”161 In July of 1995, the designated safe area of 
Srebrenica was over-run, and “some seven-thousand males were summarily massacred 
and dumped in mass graves.”162 
Principal U.S. policymakers differed sharply over the U.S. national interests at 
stake in Bosnia. While the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense argued 
that the national interests were too minimal to justify the risks, U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
maintained that what was at stake was “nothing less than American credibility around the 
world.”163 Clearly, materialist interests and a realist argument would be wholly 
inadequate to account for these two views of the national interest and much less of 
Clinton’s support of the decision to intervene. 
5. Kosovo  
Once again, Kosovo raised the issue of humanitarian intervention in the Balkans. 
Both UN Security Council Resolutions on Kosovo—1160 in March 1998 and 1199 in 
September of the same year—that were passed, prior to the NATO bombardment, were 
Chapter VII resolutions. Therefore, their provisions were binding on all states, including 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Since the resolutions were adopted under 
Chapter VII, they characterized the situation in Kosovo as one threatening international 
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peace and security and excluding the option of treating it as an internal domestic conflict. 
These resolutions also explicitly determined serious violations of human rights by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo, and an impending humanitarian catastrophe. 
The resolutions condemned the use of excessive force by Serbian security forces and the 
Yugoslav army, demanding “immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and 
to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe.”164  
The UN Security Council clearly held the view that the Kosovo situation 
constituted a humanitarian crisis long before March of 1999 and the initial NATO 
intervention. In addition, these resolutions imposed numerous obligations on the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, such as the request to remove all Serbian forces from Kosovo. 
Belgrade, however, failed to comply with these obligations. The importance of this 
failure was emphasized at the press conference announcing the beginning of the NATO 
intervention in Serbia. Humanitarian intervention and Belgrade’s refusal to comply was 
offered as the justification for the military action.  
None of these UN resolutions explicitly authorized the use of military force. It 
was evident from previous negotiations that some permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, notably Russia and China, would have invoked veto power against such 
an authorization. Therefore, the organizers of the Kosovo humanitarian intervention had 
to construct another legal justification for their action. The United Kingdom repeatedly 
argued that the NATO intervention was justified because of the legal precedents of the 
use of military force in Somalia and Bosnia and that the Security Council authorization 
for military intervention in cases of grave humanitarian necessity is now widely 
accepted.165 As previously stated, Russia and China vigorously opposed the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. Russia, with the support of China proposed a resolution 
condemning NATO’s “flagrant violation” of the UN Charter and international law and 
demanded an immediate end to the campaign.166 Franck notes the resolution was 
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defeated by an impressive majority of three to twelve—Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States voted against it.167 Franck further notes the Security 
Council must have appreciated the view of Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the British 
Ambassador to the UN, the NATO’s intervention was “justified as an exceptional 
measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”168 
6. Darfur 
Currently there is an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. 
The sub-Saharan country of Sudan, the largest country in Africa and roughly the size of 
France, has a population divided into two distinct groups—an Arab Muslim north and 
black African Christian south. Objecting to domination and government control by the 
Sudanese Arabs, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has waged an on-and-
off civil war for over twenty years. The U.S. helped to negotiate an end to the fighting 
between the north and the south; and in 2004, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was 
signed, giving the south significant autonomy.  
However, as the north-south conflict was ending in 2003, Arab tribes in the 
Darfur region attacked black (Muslim) tribesmen. With the desire of increasing their 
autonomy as well, black guerrillas from the Darfur region began military operations in 
response to the attacks. The government of Sudan responded by arming some of the Arab 
tribes, legitimizing them as militias. These actions drew international media attention as 
the most vicious of the militias, known as the Janjaweed, were shown to be 
systematically driving blacks out of villages, destroying homes, raping women, and 
killing tens and even hundreds of thousands of people.169 
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International organizations including the UN, the EU, and the AU were slow to 
react and it is important to note that it was not until pressure was felt from aid agencies 
and the media that the United States brought the matter to the attention of the UNSC, 
urging a strong and aggressive response. Eventually, under a Chapter VII mandate, the 
AU sent a small peacekeeping force of less than two thousand troops. This extension of 
the role of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), already in the country to monitor the 
ceasefire agreement between the north and the south, could do very little. Consistent with 
the normative framework of state sovereignty, Sudan objected to this outside interference 
with what was arguably a strictly internal conflict. As aid agencies and the media 
reported horrific atrocities, African governments sent in more troops.  
In May of 2004, the U.S. State Department, after a full investigation of the 
atrocities, declared the killings Darfur to be “genocide”. De Waal emphasizes the 
importance of such as label, “because it broadens the usage of the term ‘genocide’ to 
include ethnically targeted killings, rapes and displacement perpetuated in the course of 
counter-insurgency, a significant expansion on the customary usage of the term to refer to 
attempts to eliminate entire populations.”170 Even as the U.S. officially labeled the 
killings as genocide, the EU and AU along with INGOs such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch could not agree to the term of genocide.  
Sadly, all that these organizations could agree on was that a huge number (over a 
million and probably closer to two million) of Sudanese had been forcibly removed from 
their homes. Many of the displaced persons had fled to neighboring Chad. At least fifty-
thousand and perhaps as many as three-hundred-thousand people have been killed and 
just as many are in danger of malnutrition and disease.171 
In an effort to bring the situation under control, the UNSC passed several 
resolutions since the development of the fighting in Darfur in 2004. The first resolution, 
UNSCR 1564 (July 2004) added Darfur as an additional mandate under the existing UN 
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Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was overseeing the north-south peace process. In 
early 2005, the UNSC passed resolution 1590 to establish a committee to monitor the 
implementation of the measures in Darfur. In May 2006, the UNSC unanimously passed 
the implementation of a new Darfur Peace Agreement, a carry-over from the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2004. However, it was not until UNSCR 1769 in 
July 2007 that all members of the Security Council finally agreed on a UN/AU Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur—UN Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).172  
The multilateralism of the post-Cold War cases of intervention demonstrates the 
growing legitimacy of using military force to support human rights. Finnemore notes that 
the intervening states “use [multilateralism] to demonstrate that their purpose in 
intervening is not merely self-serving and particularistic but is joined in some way to the 
community interests that other states share.”173 In emphasizing the necessity of 
multilateralism to generate political support within international society, she argues: 
One testament to the power of these multilateral norms is that states 
adhere to them even when they know that doing so compromises the 
effectiveness of the mission. . . . That UN involvement continues to be a 
central feature of these operations, despite the UN’s apparent lack of 
military competence, underscores the power of multilateral norms.174 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that humanitarian intervention, multilateral or unilateral, 
is not a new phenomenon. In the first section, this chapter demonstrated cases of 
humanitarian intervention that were multilateral in reference to European powers’ 
legitimizing intervention, but unilateral in practice. These included cases of intervention 
by European powers in order to protect fellow Christians at the mercy of the Muslim  
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Ottoman Empire. The atrocities were horrific, and the intervention defined as 
humanitarian, however, with an obvious geostrategic advantage to the intervening 
country.  
The second section described three cases of intervention during the Cold War. 
Each case ended genocidal atrocities and, according to proponents of humanitarian 
intervention, were “all justifiable because the use of force was the only means of ending 
atrocities on a massive scale, and the motives/means employed were consistent with a 
positive humanitarian outcome” though this view was not shared by other states at the 
time.175 Two of the interventions resulted in regime change and the third in the creation 
of a new state. Two were debated at length by the UN Security Council, emphasizing the 
force of bipolarity during the Cold War era, which allowed for a “relatively strong 
agreement that the way they treated their citizens was a domestic matter” and that 
interference from another state was “a significant violation of sovereignty.”176 Wheeler 
argues that the lack of humanitarian justification presented by the intervening countries 
during the Cold War calls attention to the legitimacy of the multilateral humanitarian 
intervention of the first decade of the post-Cold War era.177  
The end of the Cold War allowed for states to view the internal aggression of state 
behavior as an indicator of external policy. Finnemore argues:  
States that abuse citizens in massive or systematic ways are now viewed as 
security threats because of the flows of refugees and social tensions that 
such policies create are destabilizing to neighbors and because aggressive 
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As demonstrated in the post-Cold War cases, what used to be labeled as atrocities or 
genocide are now characterized as threats to international peace and security. This style 
of argument was not used in the nineteenth-century cases. The intervening countries in 
the three Cold War cases relied on customary international law and border incursions as 
justification for intervention.  
The post-Cold War era emphasizes that humanitarian intervention must be 
multilateral to be viewed as legitimate in international society.179 The following two 
chapters will demonstrate the process of articulation and its key role in emergence of the 
norm of humanitarian intervention. Chapter IV will begin with the post-Cold War 
intervention in northern Iraq following the removal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and end 
with the Bosnian War in the mid-1990s. Chapter V, demonstrating the process of 
articulation, will carry on in the Balkans from Bosnia to the Kosovo War. This chapter 
will specifically discuss the role the Kosovo War had on the implementation of the 
International Committee on State Sovereignty (ICSS) determination of sovereignty as a 
responsibility. 
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IV. ARTICULATING THE NORM LIFE CYCLE OF POST-COLD 
WAR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Using the process of articulation described in Chapter II, the next two chapters 
will trace the emergence and the life cycle, as suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink,180 of 
the norm of humanitarian intervention from the early 1990s to the eventual tipping point 
and norm cascade of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the first stage of norm 
emergence, “norms are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate 
or desirable behavior in their community.”181 These agents, termed “norm entrepreneurs” 
by Finnemore and Sikkink, “are critical for norm emergence because they call attention 
to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes 
them.”182 By means of articulation and the construction of cognitive phrases, norm 
entrepreneurs “resonate with the broader public understandings [which become] adopted 
as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.”183 
Tal Alkopher notes that it was the “discourse of ‘the new interventionism’ and 
subsequent General Assembly and Security Council resolutions during the conflicts in 
northern Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-5 that laid the 
ground” for a new, military form of interventionism.184 Furthermore, she states, the 
resolutions “constituted a breakthrough in which human rights discourse took root, and 
the practice of military humanitarian intervention emerged.”185 This chapter discusses the 
norms articulated over the course of each of these conflicts in turn. It ends with the 
Bosnian war and illustrates the norm entrepreneurship of U.S. National Security Advisor  
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Anthony Lake and his efforts to encourage decisive action in the Balkans, thus pushing 
the norm of humanitarian intervention to what Finnemore and Sikkink describe as the 
“tipping point.”186 
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE POST-COLD WAR NORM OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The first post-Cold War incarnation of humanitarian intervention came in the 
aftermath of the first Gulf War of 1991, a war fought with the explicit aim of defending 
Kuwait’s sovereignty.187 After the ground war, nearly 600,000 Kurds, fleeing retribution 
from Iraqi soldiers, took refuge in the mountains on the Iraqi-Turkish border. Strobe 
Talbott notes that President George H. W. Bush was reluctant to intervene; however, 
pressure came from four sources: constant media attention to the starving masses; 
President Halil Turgut Ozal of Turkey, who now had over half a million internally 
displaced persons on his border; Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain and 
President Francois Mitterrand of France, who both had been indispensable in the ground 
war to remove Hussein from Kuwait; and lastly, and most surprisingly, from Secretary of 
State James Baker.188 Talbott states that Baker—“a self-avowed realist”189—visited a 
refugee camp on the Turkish-Iraqi border for a brief twelve minutes and realized the 
gravity of the humanitarian situation and the need for the United States to pressure the 
UN to do something to alleviate the suffering.190  
On April 5, 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 688, insisting on 
“unfettered access for humanitarian agencies and demanding an end to the repression of 
civilian populations.”191 It is important to note that Resolution 688 did not proceed 
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through the Security Council easily. Lori Damrosch notes that “some UN representatives 
argued that the gravity of the repression itself constituted a threat to the peace,192 while 
others emphasized the transboundary consequences of massive refugee flows.”193 She 
notes that some states would have found the notion of intervention against the 
sovereignty of Iraq to be unthinkable, apart from the egregious cross-border annexation 
attempt recently committed by Iraq. Resolution 688 passed despite China and India 
abstaining from voting. Writing in 1993, Damrosch concludes that “these factors indicate 
that the UN is far from a consensus on the conditions that would warrant a repetition of 
this precedent.”194  
Resolution 688 stressed the effects of Iraq’s actions, against its Kurdish 
population, on other nations in the region, stating that the UN was: 
gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas 
which led to a massive flow of refugees toward and across international 
frontiers and to cross border incursions, which threaten international peace 
and security in the region.195 
It is important to note the phrase “threaten international peace and security.” 
Resolution 688 did not invoke a Chapter VII authorization; it only insisted on the 
unfettered access of humanitarian relief. Supporters of future UN Security Council 
Resolutions would utter the same phrase, and demand that the crisis was a “threat to 
international peace and security.” The repetition of this phrase by advocates of the norm 
of humanitarian intervention is a critical part of norm emergence. From UNSR 688, the  
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norm of intervention to aid those oppressed by their own governments emerged and 
future resolutions would not fall short of formal invocation of Chapter VII and the 
authorization to use force. 
The emergence was not, however, uncontested. There was criticism because the 
safe havens created to convince the Kurds to leave the frigid cold of the mountains were 
not specifically authorized in Resolution 688.196 France, Great Britain and the United 
States repeatedly justified this intervention as legal by claiming that the measures taken 
were consistent with the stated mandate of Resolution 688.197 In addition, the operation 
was not performed with the consent of the government in Baghdad, which continually 
claimed that Iraqi sovereignty was violated by the intervention.  
The debate regarding Resolution 688 illustrates Weldes argument of the process 
of articulation. For example, French President Mitterrand, declared that the failure of the 
UN to protect the Kurds would “severely affect the political and moral authority” of the 
Council.198 French Foreign Minister Dumas pleaded that the society of states had a “duty 
to intervention.”199 He paralleled the plight of the Kurds with the Nazi genocide of the 
Jews and argued that the Iraq attacks on the Kurds were “crimes against humanity.”200 
The demands of Mitterrand and Dumas illustrated the growing demands of “French 
society that sovereignty should be no barrier to the relief of suffering.”201  
Prime Minister Major of Great Britain received an increasing amount of pressure 
from the media and from the opposition party. Martin Shaw notes that in relation to 
British television coverage, “it was overlaid with an unremitting commentary pinning 
responsibility simply and directly on Western leaders, especially [President George H. 
W.] Bush and [Prime Minister John] Major.”202 Furthermore, former Prime Minister 
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Margaret Thatcher, had met with a Kurdish delegation, and afterwards, told a reporter, “it 
is not a question of standing on legal niceties. The people need help and they need it 
now.”203 Wheeler notes that five days later, “Major decided that he had to respond to the 
growing pressures for action to save the Kurds.”204  
The next development in the emergence stage of the life cycle of the norm of 
humanitarian intervention was in Somalia in 1992. Prior to the UN mission to Somalia, 
UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda For Peace identified humanitarian 
reasons as driving the deployment of UN military force to alleviate suffering. The report 
noted that the deployment of UN troops rested on a number of key criteria. Firstly, on the 
premise that the violence among the factions in the region was limited or controlled; 
secondly, that humanitarian aid was impartially provided; and thirdly, that it could save 
lives and would add to the development of “conditions of safety in which negotiations 
could be held.”205 The use of force was predicated on the UN having autonomous 
command over participating troops. This was not always achievable as member states 
lacked “the political will to match their rhetorical commitments with intellectual and 
material resources.”206 
The situation in Somalia had been deteriorating for some time when the first of 
five UN Security Council resolutions, all under Chapter VII guidelines, placed an arms 
embargo on the African nation in January of 1992.207 Wheeler notes that the 
humanitarian tragedy that had overcome the Somali people in 1991-1992 was a “result of 
the civil war and subsequent disintegration of the state that followed the fall of the 
government of Siad Barre in January 1991.”208 Pressure in the United States for action to 
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help those starving in the Horn of Africa first came in late April 1991 when U.S. Senators 
Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon held hearings on Somalia and “urged an immediate 
cease-fire and relief effort.”209 Rice and Loomis note the effect that cable television had 
on President George H. W. Bush’s decision to take the case to the United Nations. 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger acknowledged that “television had a great deal 
to do with President Bush’s decision to go in in the first place.”210 Eagleburger continues, 
emphasizing that a primary reason was “because of the television pictures of those 
starving kids.”211 In addition, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, comparing the 
advantages of intervening in Somalia over Bosnia, stated “It was not that we were afraid 
to intervene abroad; it was just that the circumstances weren’t right in Bosnia.”212 He 
added, “Somalia gave us [the George H. W. Bush administration] the ability to show they 
[critics of the first Bush administration] were wrong. It was a Southern Hemisphere state; 
it was black; it was non-Christian; it was everything that epitomized the Third World.”213 
Furthermore, Bush had lost the 1992 presidential election. This statement suggests that 
today, humanitarian intervention is not intended to defend the rights of Christians or 
whites, but human rights and claims inherent to all humans without distinction. This 
statement illustrates the fact that for the U.S. and the European nations the norm had 
emerged past the saving of fellow Christians as was witnessed in the nineteenth century. 
Also evident in this statement is that the intervention in Somalia did not include a 
geostrategic advantage as did the Cold War examples. 
On December 3, 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
794, authorizing a U.S.-led UN force to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as 
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possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”214 
However, the American experience in the Horn of Africa ended in tragedy with the death 
of eighteen service members on October 3, 1993. With both the new U.S. administration 
of President William J. Clinton and the U.S. Congress furious over these deaths, and 
unwilling to sustain additional casualties, the United States withdrew its military forces in 
March 1994.215 
B. THE EFFECT OF NON-INTERVENTION ON THE NORM OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
In January 1995 as the last of the UN peacekeepers left Somalia, Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali authored a supplement to his An Agenda for Peace, that UN 
missions were gradually becoming involved more in intrastate rather than interstate 
conflicts. The supplement noted that, of the five humanitarian operations underway in 
1988, only one involved an intrastate conflict.216 Of the twenty-one UN missions since 
1988, Teson notes, “thirteen (62 percent) involved intrastate conflict. The trend is 
growing even more pronounced in the UN’s most recent operations. Of the eleven 
operations since January 1992, nine (82 percent) involve intrastate conflicts.”217 
Darren Brunk emphasizes that the Somalia intervention was “a warning shot 
across the international community’s bow—it tempered enthusiasm for humanitarian 
intervention . . . [and highlighted that] interventions are not without risks, and these risks 
were not without their domestic political consequences.”218 Key lessons of the Somalia 
intervention were carried over, both in practice and in the arguments presented for and  
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against, the eventual humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in June of 1994. Speaking to 
the UN General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton cautioned the 
international community: 
In recent weeks in the Security Council, our nation has begun asking 
harder questions about proposals for new peacekeeping missions. Is there 
a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear 
objectives? Can an exit point be identified of those who will be asked to 
participate? How much will it cost? From now on, the United Nations 
should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission 
before we vote and before the mission begins.219 
The lessons were further emphasized in the rhetoric of U.S. Congressman, Western 
leaders, and the media during the debates of when and how the UN should intervene to 
stop the genocide in Rwanda. Speaking on the floor of Congress only days after the U.S. 
casualties in Mogadishu, Congressman Harold Rogers remarked:  
Even as the President this minute is trying to justify to American parents 
why their sons and daughters are sacrificing their lives in Somalia, I have 
learned that the night before last his United Nations Ambassador voted in 
the United Nations, and they approved, another peacekeeping operation. 
This one is in Rwanda. . . . Where does it end? Can anyone in this room 
tell me where Rwanda is, or why we are going there, or what vital 
American interest is at stake in Rwanda? . . . We are told we are going to 
be patrolling between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis in 
Rwanda. Why, Mr. Speaker?220 
Great Britain’s Ambassador to the UN opposed reinforcing the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and reminded the members to “think back to 
Somalia and think about what you would ask these troops to do.”221  
Historians Spanier and Hook use the phrase “Somalia syndrome”—a combination 
derived partly from the calamity of Somalia and partly from the term “Gulf War 
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syndrome” describing adverse post-war effects—to illustrate President Clinton’s frame of 
mind as he signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 in May 1994. The directive 
placed strict conditions on U.S. support for UN peacekeeping missions.222 It stated that 
“the USA would contribute to operations only where its national interests were engaged 
and that its soldiers would always remain under national command and control.”223 The 
underlying theme of PDD 25 included the need for full public and Congressional 
support.224 Brunk notes the resultant chilling effect of PDD 25 in comments made by 
former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in a 2003 interview. According to the 
Secretary-General, because of PDD 25:  
the United States would say, ‘We don’t allow you to do a peacekeeping 
operation even without the United States. Why? Because, one, we have to 
contribute thirty percent of the budget of this peacekeeping operation, and 
two—and let us be objective—it is true in the case that you will have 
problems in this peacekeeping operation, you will ask our assistance, and 
we will be compelled to give you this assistance.’ . . . So practically, it was 
a return to the [non-intervention] policy of the United States.225 
When referring to Rwanda, the Clinton Administration avoided the word 
“genocide.” Brunk emphasizes that although the Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
and his staff clearly recognized the nature of the violence in Rwanda, “State Department 
officials were forbidden from employing the term ‘genocide’ until June [1994].”226 The 
administration was afraid that to use the word genocide “would raise the awkward legal 
question as to whether the USA was obliged to intervene under the 1948 Convention 
[Against Genocide].”227 According to then-Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, 
the State Department was conflicted “over what obligations might flow . . . [and] about 
how might we be viewed if we declared that there is genocide and then do nothing about 
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it.”228 The United States policy makers’ resistance to use the genocide term was not due 
to a misperception of the conflict in Rwanda, but rather “a conscious decision to avoid 
representations that might conceivably necessitate greater interventionist action.”229 
Wheeler chronicles the personalities and the events that pushed the UN Security 
Council to finally take action in Rwanda. Under pressure from the Secretary-General and 
the Czech and New Zealand representatives, the Security Council met informally on 
April 28th and 29th to discuss the alarming situation.230 At the same time, Czech 
Ambassador Karel Kovanda, convened a number of the non-permanent members to hear 
first-hand experiences of the carnage from Alison des Forges, a human rights advocate 
for Human Rights Watch Africa. After hearing her testimony, the Czech Ambassador 
pressed the Security Council to declare the actions in Rwanda genocide. Wheeler notes, 
“Kovanda’s family were survivors of the Holocaust and his words must have carried 
considerable moral force when he likened the UN’s current approach as ‘rather like 
wanting Hitler to reach a ceasefire with the Jews’”.231  
Ambassador Kovanda gained support in the Security Council from a number of 
non-permanent members but found strong opposition from China, the United States, and 
Great Britain. Only after Ambassador Keating of New Zealand threatened to table a draft 
resolution for the General Assembly was a compromise reached. Wheeler notes that this 
“would require a vote and would expose members’ position to the glare of world public 
opinion.”232 Keating and the permanent members of the Security Council compromised 
by issuing a Presidential Statement that used language from the Genocide Convention, 
but did not explicitly invoke the term genocide.233 
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Their fears of the glare of international public opinion were well founded for, as 
Finnemore notes, “the Genocide Convention actually makes action mandatory. 
Signatories must stop genocide, defined as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’”.234 She argues that 
although the UN failed to intervene in Rwanda until most of the killing had stopped, the 
debate demonstrates the normative terrain of humanitarian intervention. Finnemore 
identifies that in contrast to prior Cold War cases of intervention, “no significant 
constituency was claiming that intervention in Rwanda for humanitarian purposes would 
have been illegitimate or an illegal breach of sovereignty. States did not fear the kind of 
response India received when it intervened in East Pakistan.”235 Finnemore argues, 
“states understood that they had not just a right but a duty to intervene”236 in Rwanda. 
Furthermore, in emphasizing the buildup of stage one of the emergence of the norm of 
humanitarian intervention, Finnemore states that “a shift in normative burdens to act, 
intervention norms now place strict requirements on the ways humanitarian interventions 
can be carried out.”237  
In June 1994 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 925, authorizing France 
to deploy a force to stop the now sporadic killing and to protect the roughly one million 
internally displaced persons on the border of neighboring Zaire. Media attention to the 
new humanitarian crisis of the internally displaced persons led to U.S. public pressure for 
direct U.S. military involvement. In July “the U.S. government [with multilateral 
authorization from the UN] finally mobilized its forces to assist the million refugees 
crammed into unsanitary, cholera-prone camps.”238 At the height of the UN relief 
operation in Rwanda, the United States contributed twenty-six hundred troops and staff to 
various points in East Africa. 
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Comments from U.S. Congressman and international leaders would lead one to 
think that the norm of humanitarian intervention died as the last troops left Somalia, 
exemplified in the extremely belated and reluctant response of the international 
community to intervene to stop further genocide in Rwanda. However, as tragic as the 
international community’s reaction to mass killing in Rwanda was, scholars note the 
reference to not allowing another “Rwandan” genocide in our lifetime, demonstrates that 
the norm, although not acted upon, was still in existence.239 
C. BOSNIA—A TIPPING POINT AND NORM ENTREPRENEURS  
The first UN Security Council Resolution to provide humanitarian support in the 
growing crisis in the Balkans was Resolution 770, adopted on August 13, 1992. This 
resolution was the result of media reports of a Serb detention center for Muslim 
prisoners. Great Britain and France provided armed escorts for the humanitarian aid 
workers and the relief convoys, all in support of the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. Wheeler notes that “both governments were determined to 
avoid deploying ground troops in a combat role, but at the same time neither felt that it 
could be seen to be doing nothing in the face of the worst abuses of human rights in 
Europe since the end of the Second World War.”240 
Throughout the Bosnian crisis, Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake pressed for increased American leadership and involvement. Daalder describes him 
as a “policy entrepreneur.”241 Up against hardened realists such as Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher and earlier on, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin 
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Powell, “Lake put in place a policy process that [ . . . ] encouraged the president to 
conclude that the course of action being pursued by the U.S. was heading nowhere.”242  
Lake developed an endgame strategy which began with the withdrawal of the 
UNPROFOR troops, lifting the arms embargo, providing training and much-needed arms 
to the Bosnians, and eventually conducting airstrikes on Bosnian Serb ground forces. 
Once Clinton was on board with Lake’s endgame strategy, the national security advisor 
worked to convince other members of the foreign policy staff of the merits of different 
aspects of the plan. Daalder explains, “after having given them his ideas, Lake requested 
that Christopher, Perry, Shalikashvili and Albright each come up with their own 
strategy.”243 After vetting by the president’s principal foreign policy advisors, the four 
policy papers were presented to Clinton on August, 4 1995, and discussed at a series of 
meetings over three days. Daalder emphasizes, “In the end, Lake succeeded in being the 
true policy entrepreneur: his approach became policy with the full backing not only of the 
president but all senior advisors engaged in the formulation of U.S. policy toward 
Bosnia.”244 
Its should be noted that Daalder’s description of Lake as a “policy entrepreneur” 
for his work in advocating a major policy shift to Clinton is not entirely the same as the 
“norm-entrepreneur” described by Finnemore and Sikkink. However, Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s description of norm-entrepreneurs as those who “attempt to convince a critical 
mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms”245 can also include those who 
attempt to convince those who are highly influential in national governments and in 
international society. It is argued that the West, the UN, and NATO had to “do 
something.” Lake saw that “the time was ripe to propose a change in direction” of U.S. 
foreign policy.246 His work undoubtedly pushed along the norm of humanitarian 
intervention. 
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Karin Fierke argues that the United States drew on four sets of past experiences to 
“name the Bosnian context.”247 She states that “the constructs are based on clusters of 
related categories, identifiable by their family resemblance with a particular historical 
context.”248 All of the words and phrases have been used repeatedly in public accounts of 
the Bosnian conflict. Fierke states that this repetition illustrates “the coherence 
underlying these interpretations because of rules projected from a past context.”249  
The first analogy demonstrated by Fierke is that of World War II. The Bosnian 
Serbs were compared to the Nazis, the Bosnian Muslims to the Jews, and the United 
States and NATO to the Allied forces. The second analogy, for doing nothing to stop 
Serbian aggression, is the appeasement that arguably allowed the rise of Hitler. In this 
interpretation, the United States’ “appeasement is a sign of weakness which will only 
increase the strength of the aggressor. Intervention would lead to liberation of those who 
suffer and thereby result in a winning strategy.”250  
Comparing Bosnia to Vietnam, was the third analogy, as did Colin Powell as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior officers of his generation. From 
this perspective, Bosnia looked like a quagmire in which the U.S. had no clear war aims 
and no exit strategy. According to Fierke, the Vietnam comparison prevailed in the U.S. 
from the spring of 1992 until the summer of 1995. During the Bosnian conflict, “the 
hesitation of the United States to become involved on the ground was coupled with 
arguments that the arms embargo should be lifted so that the Bosnians could more 
effectively defend themselves against the Bosnian Serbs.”251  
The fourth analogy, echoing the view of many European statesmen, was one of 
the First World War, suggesting the danger that violence in Sarajevo could draw the 
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Great Powers into a major conflagration.252 Kierke notes the analogy reinforced action, 
specifically that a “great power conflict is to be avoided by involving the major 
contemporary powers directly in decision-making over this conflict in a peaceful way 
within the Security Council.”253 
In norm development, Annika Bjorkdahl emphasizes an “element of repetitive 
action is often stressed as crucial to the formation of an international norm.”254 The 
repetitiveness of activities and phrases relating to humanitarian intervention increased in 
1995 as the Clinton administration and the U.S. Congress differed on the desired 
approach to the continuing crisis in the Balkans.  
This element of repetition is evident in the articulation and choice of words used 
by policy makers and the media during the entire Balkan crises. Articulated initially in 
relation to the Jewish concentration camps of the Second World War, then used in 
relation to the UN’s belated response to the genocide in Rwanda in April and May of 
1994, and finally in relation to the Srebrenica massacre in July of 1995 was the phrase 
“never again.” The continued use of the phrase convinced Senator Robert Dole to lead 
Congress into action. Daalder states, “bolstered by the horrifying stories emerging from 
Srebrenica, the U.S. Congress challenged the Clinton administration to change course by 
voting overwhelmingly to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia.”255  
Fierke articulates a “word game” over the Bosnian Serbs taking UN peacekeepers 
en masse as hostages.256 The media and Western policy makers described them as 
“human shields” as they were handcuffed to military targets. From these actions, the 
Bosnian Serbs earned the description as “terrorists.” Fierke states, while “applying the 
name ‘terrorist’ to the Bosnian Serbs, Western or UN actors made moves that were to the 
contrary [ . . . ], that is, they ‘made concessions’, against the background of threats by the 
Bosnian Serbs that any attempt to ‘liberate’ the hostages would be writing their death 
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warrant.”257 Furthermore, as the lack of impartiality of the UNPROFOR became more 
apparent, Western “appeasement” to the Bosnian Serbs was combined with “conceding” 
and “bowing” and set against the background of criminal acts—specifically “ethnic 
cleansing.” As Fierke notes, these terms were “structured around an ‘aggressor’, ‘victim’, 
and potential ‘liberator’”.258  
The repeated occurrences of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs 
heightened Western moral imperative to “do something.” In this context, “there is a direct 
relationship between moral outrage, expressed in international public opinion” and 
distractions from a hands-off approach of doing as little as possible in order to keep the 
conflict from spreading out of the Balkans.259 As atrocities in Bosnia mounted, Fierke 
illustrates that “the articulation of the threat of air strikes emerged immediately in 
response to international outrage over the death of 58 civilians in Sarajevo.”260  
Fierke emphasizes a critical point in the international moral outrage and then 
action of the NATO forces. She states, “after the Bosnian Serb attack on Sarajevo at the 
end of August 1995, killing 36 civilians and wounding 90, NATO was finally authorized 
to actualize the air strike campaign against Bosnian Serb targets.”261 NATO air strikes 
clearly place the UN in the role of a combatant.262 In illustrating norm emergence, 
Finnemore and Sikkink state “after norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of 
states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms, we can say the norm reaches a 
threshold or tipping point.”263  
For norm entrepreneurs to further the norm emergence, Finnemore and Sikkink 
suggest the entrepreneur needs an organizational platform. In this instance it would be the 
UN and NATO—the UN by authorizing and giving legitimacy to the air strikes and 
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NATO for carrying them out. UN Security Council Resolution 836, passed on June 4, 
1993 with two abstentions (Russia and China), extended UNPROFOR’s mandate to deter 
the attacks against the safe areas.264 To fulfill this mandate, NATO, “under the authority 
of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and 
UNPROFOR,” was empowered to take “all necessary means, through the use of air 
power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”265  
D. CONCLUSION 
The attacks on Sarajevo and the international community’s acceptance of 
NATO’s authorized use of air power initiated the tipping point of the norm of 
humanitarian intervention. The norm was pushed past the tipping point and closer to the 
norm cascading stage after the safe havens of Zepa, Bihac, and Srebrenica were overrun 
in 1995. In the case of Srebrenica, “at least 7,414 Muslim men were systematically 
rounded up and killed by Mladic’s forces in the worst war crime of the whole war.”266 
This chapter has traced development of the norm of humanitarian intervention 
through the first half of the post-Cold War interventions of the 1990s, demonstrating the 
willingness of Western countries, through the multilateral use of UN Chapter VII 
authority to use military force to save not only Christians, as in the case of the nineteenth 
century, but Kurds in northern Iraq and starving Somalis in the Horn of Africa. The UN 
stood by as genocide took place in Rwanda with the Clinton Administration still furious 
over Somalia. The reluctance to intervene in Rwanda pushed President Clinton into 
developing a new strategy for the Bosnian crisis. National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake took on the mantle and initiated a change in course by lifting the arms embargo and 
striking Bosnian Serb positions. The decision by the UN to use force and specifically to 
use NATO to bomb targets in the Balkans pushed the norm of humanitarian intervention 
past the tipping point and toward the second stage of the norm life cycle—norm cascade. 
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V. GETTING TO THE THIRD AND FINAL STAGE—NORM 
INTERNALIZATION 
This chapter describes the normative shift of humanitarian intervention from the 
tipping point in of the Bosnian war (the first stage of the norm life cycle), illustrated in 
the previous chapter, all the way to the doorstep of the third stage of the norm life 
cycle—norm internalization. The norm shifted into the second stage—norm cascade—
after the culmination of the Kosovo conflict and the subsequent finding of the 
Independent International Committee on Kosovo of the war as “illegal but legitimate.”267 
The final stage—norm internalization—began with the international community’s 
enunciation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as suddenly the principles of R2P 
acquired normative status. The chapter progresses to describe the principles of R2P as a 
norm. Lastly, the chapter identifies Secretary-General Kofi Annan as he acted as a norm 
entrepreneur and took steps to move the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention 
onto the doorstep of the third stage of the norm life cycle—norm internalization. His 
articulation emphasized the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens, rather than the 
right and duty of humanitarian intervention, and thus set the grounds for multilateral 
protection, should a state fail to uphold its responsibility. 
A. KOSOVO 
Despite agreements made by Slobodan Milosevic regarding the Kosovar province 
of Serbia during a series of exhaustive diplomatic negotiations in the fall of 1998 through 
the winter of 1999, “nearly 80,000 Albanians were forced by Serb forces to flee their 
homes between the end of December and mid-March 1999.”268 In order to stop the 
widespread violence, on March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force. The 
campaign consisted of an air war targeting Serb military positions and Serb leadership in  
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Belgrade. The NATO-led bombardment lasted until June 11, 1999, when Milosevic 
relented and agreed to “end all violence in Kosovo, withdraw all Serb forces, and submit 
to an international presence under UN auspices.”269  
The bombing campaign against Milosevic and Belgrade in support of the Kosovar 
Albanians, without UN Security Council authorization, remains controversial among 
scholars and diplomats.270 While the United States and its NATO allies initially sought a 
Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force, most recognized that 
would be impossible because of strong disagreements from both Russia and China. 
However, the United States and Western European governments determined their cause 
just and legitimated by the collective action of NATO, and as not requiring a further vote 
by the Security Council. These governments “cited a long series of UN resolutions 
challenging Serbian treatment of the Albanian population in Kosovo, in particular 
UNSCR 1199, approved on September 23, 1998, by a vote of 14-0, which called for the 
immediate withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.”271  
In Resolution 1199, passed under Chapter VII, the Security Council advocated 
that the threat to peace and security in the Balkans centered on the “deterioration of the 
situation in Kosovo.”272 The resolution was not one sided, it demanded that the Milosevic 
regime and Kosovo Albanians cease hostilities in order to “avert the impending 
humanitarian catastrophe.”273 The United States and Great Britain argued for a more 
strongly worded resolution. Wheeler notes that after states had settled on a much less 
forceful resolution, Russian Ambassador to the UN Lavrov stated that “no use of force 
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and no sanctions are being imposed by the Council at the present stage . . . the use of 
unilateral measures of force in order to settle the conflict is fraught with the risk of 
destabilizing the Balkan region and of all of Europe and would have long-term adverse 
consequences.”274 China, also reluctant to sign Resolution 1199, did not believe the 
situation in Kosovo to be a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, the 
Chinese Ambassador argued that resolution 1199 had “invoked Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter all too indiscreetly in order to threaten the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia” and the resolution “would adversely affect the possibilities for a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict.”275 
The lack of unanimous support from the UN and a specific resolution to use force 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia complicated the issue but did not stop the 
United States and European leaders from agreeing to confront Serbian forces with air 
power. Though the NATO countries agreed that a Security Council mandate with explicit 
authorization would have been preferable, “in the end the humanitarian conditions in 
Kosovo persuaded European states to join in the effort to protect civilians.”276 Arguing in 
favor of military force, French President Jacques Chirac argued that action was justified 
in the face of a humanitarian crisis: 
In this particular case, we have a resolution which does open the way to 
the possibility of military action. I would add, I repeat, that the 
humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to 
the rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation 
required it, then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to 
intervene in order to assist those that are in danger.277 
Echoing Chirac’s remarks, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi and French Foreign 
Minister Hubert Vedrine jointly stated:  
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Our shared position of principle . . . is that, before any military 
intervention . . . the Security Council must adopt a Resolution authorizing 
that intervention. But in the specific case of Kosovo, on which a 
Resolution citing Chapter VII has already been adopted, we must . . . keep 
a very close eye on the humanitarian aspect of the situation . . . which can 
demand very rapid . . . implementation of measures to deal with an 
emergency.”278 
When Milosevic accepted NATO’s terms and the aerial bombardment ended, Chirac 
asserted, “human rights is a notion which today has imposed itself and has opposed the 
normal centrifugal forces in the life of nations and the relations they might have.”279 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasized his backing of a U.S.-led air 
campaign against Milosevic’s regime when he stated, “there are no half-measures to his 
brutality, and there can be no half-measures about how we deal with it. No compromises, 
no fudge, no half-baked deals.”280 Defending a U.S.-led NATO sponsored action, Blair 
continued, “America has once again shown that it has the vision to see that instability, 
chaos and racial genocide in the heart of Europe will never affect Europe alone.”281 
The German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder argued in favor of NATO air strikes 
stating that, in reference to UN Resolution 1199, NATO was “not [giving] itself a 
mandate, it [was] acting within the reference framework of the United Nations.”282 
However, Guicherd notes that Schroder hoped that in the future the Security Council 
would be able to come to an agreement on stopping mass abuses of human rights as 
Schroder reasserted the “UN monopoly on the use of force and the responsibility of the 
Security Council for the preservation of world peace and international security.”283 
Furthermore, Wheeler notes the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, argued in favor 
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of Resolution 1199 justifying NATO action. Kinkel stated, “under these unusual 
circumstances of the current crisis situation in Kosovo, as it is described in Resolution 
1199 of the UN Security Council, the threat of and if need be the use of force by NATO 
is justified.”284 It is important to note that Kinkel emphasized that Kosovo was a special 
case and that “NATO has not created a new legal instrument which could be the basis for 
a general license for NATO to do interventions [. . .] NATO’s decision must not become 
a precedent.”285 The NATO air campaign was the first time the German military 
participated in combat since World War II. 
Rice and Loomis note that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan “contributed to the 
sense that the humanitarian norm of protecting human lives had outpaced the norm of 
sovereign inviolability.”286 In June 1998, Annan, speaking at an annual retreat for elite 
figures in British diplomacy and international relations, closed by reminding his audience 
of the failure to act effectively in Bosnia and Rwanda: 
Each of us as an individual has to take his or her share of responsibility [. . 
.] no one will be able to say that they were taken by surprise. All our 
professions of regret; all our expressions of determination to never again 
permit another Bosnia; all our hopes for a peaceful future for the Balkans 
will be cruelly mocked if we allow Kosovo to become another killing 
field.287 
Annan maintained that the Security Council was solely responsible for military action 
other than defense of a nation under Article 51 of the Charter; however, he acknowledged 
that “there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace.”288  
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James Traub quotes the Secretary-General as saying: “When you look at the Declaration 
of Human Rights, the principle behind intervention in Kosovo was quite legitimate. The 
fact that the council couldn’t come together doesn’t make it not legitimate.”289 
Alex Bellamy states that in the past decade since NATO action in Kosovo, there 
has been growing evidence of acceptance “that intervention can be legitimate in 
humanitarian emergencies.”290 Kieran Prendergast, the chief of the UN’s political affairs 
department, had a different view than that of the Secretary-General. According to Traub, 
Prendergast stated “for those of us who care about multilateralism and collective action, 
this action by NATO was a crossing of the Rubicon, because for the first time countries 
like Norway and Denmark and the Netherlands, that had always given primacy to the 
international rule of law, were willing to go along with the action.”291 Therefore, the 
emerging view is that, if humanitarian intervention is not possible with the authorization 
of the Security Council, then military action may be justified and lawful in cases of 
proven imminent humanitarian catastrophe such as in the case of the creation of the safe 
havens in Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999.292 Finally, it is important to note that neither 
during nor after the NATO intervention in Serbia did the UN Security Council adopt a 
resolution condemning NATO’s use of military force.293 
The debate as to whether or not NATO should use force without a UN resolution 
explicitly authorizing it to do so illustrates Weldes’ argument of the process of 
articulation.294 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright emphasized the recent action 
in Bosnia when she stated, “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serb authorities 
do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia.”295 Other authors note  
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the experiences that prevented action in Rwanda that could have significantly limited the 
butchery.296 This amplified a “never again” idiom which arose from inaction in Rwanda 
and resulted in action in Kosovo. 
Alkopher notes that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo for humanitarian reasons is 
not the first time a collective group of European countries have sought to protect the 
rights of a minority. However, it is correctly viewed as differing substantially from past 
humanitarian interventions. Alkopher states “it marked the first time an international 
organization intervened because of intersubjective norms—rather than subjective or 
personal ideas—that are embedded in the international political social structure and are 
capable of placing the protection of human rights before the preservation of a state’s 
political and territorial sovereignty.”297 Wheeler notes “it is hard to resist the conclusion 
that Germany [and other NATO allies] found itself in the difficult position of supporting 
an action on ethical grounds, knowing that this at best had a dubious basis in international 
law, and at worst was illegal.”298 
Humanitarian reasoning for intervention was repeatedly offered by NATO 
leaders.299 In a televised speech, U.S. President Bill Clinton proclaimed that NATO’s 
action was a result of the “moral revulsion at the killing in Kosovo and to prevent 
genocide in the heart of Europe.”300 On March 24, 1999, the Canadian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy in a speech to the House of Commons, stated, 
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while an entire population is displaced, people are killed, villages are burned and looted, 
and a population is denied its basic rights because it does not belong to the ‘right’ ethnic 
group.”301 On the same day, French President Jacque Chirac told his country: 
I would like to explain to the French people why NATO is going to 
conduct an operation against the Serb forces of President Milosevic. . . . 
Everything has been done to achieve a rational solution, one of peace. One 
complying with human rights. Everything. In the face of President 
Milosevic’s unjustifiable and incomprehensive obstinacy, the allies 
unanimously took the view that there were no longer any other options 
than to intervene militarily against clearly targeted Serb objectives in order 
to contain a tragedy which is gradually threatening the stability of the 
whole Balkan region.302 
The German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder also deemed it necessary to explain to 
his nation the necessity of the NATO mission to stop the pending atrocities by the Serbs 
against the Kosovar Albanians. Schroder stated, “Over the weeks and months before the 
air strikes began the international community left no stone unturned to bring about a 
political solution to the conflict.” Schroder continued, describing the atrocities, “The 
campaign of ethnic cleansing we are witnessing today was planned by the Yugoslav 
Government from the outset. It has cost thousands in Kosovo their lives.”303 The 
humanitarian rationale was echoed by the Netherlands, “Over half a quarter million 
Kosovars have fled the indiscriminate violence inflicted by the Yugoslav troops. The 
victims are innocent civilians. This situation cannot be allowed to continue.”304 British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking to the House of Commons, described the atrocities 
and the humanitarian reasons for military action. Blair stated, “Families are being  
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uprooted and driven from their homes. There are reports of masked irregulars separating 
out the men: we don’t know what has happened to them. The House will recall that at 
Srebrenica, they were killed.”305 
Czech President Vaclav Havel described NATO’s actions to save the Kosovar 
Albanians from impending atrocities as a war fought over “principles and values rather 
than over national interests” and as demonstrating “not disrespect for international law, 
but respect for the higher law of human rights over state sovereignty.”306 Havel continues 
by stating, “if one can say any war that is ethical, or that it is being waged for ethical 
reasons, then it is true of this war.”307  
Russia was emphatically against the use of force by NATO to stop the atrocities 
against the Kosovar Albanians. Speaking to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, 
Russian Ambassador Sergey Lavrov made his nation’s disappointment clear arguing that 
The Russian Federation is profoundly outraged at the use by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization of military force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In recent weeks, when we were constantly 
hearing threats—detrimental to the negotiating process—that there would 
be missile strikes against Serbian positions in Kosovo and other parts of 
Serbia, the Russian Government strongly proclaimed its categorical 
rejection of the use of force in contravention of decisions of the Security 
Council and issued repeated warnings about the long-term harmful 
consequences of this action not only for the prospects of a settlement of 
the Kosovo situation and for safeguarding security in the Balkans, but also 
for the stability of the entire modern multi-polar system of international 
relations.308 
Also speaking the UN General Assembly, the Chinese Ambassador Qin Huasun also 
denounced the NATO air campaign stating it “amounts to a blatant violation of the 
United Nations Charter and of the accepted norms of international law. The Chinese 
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Government strongly opposes this act.” The Chinese ambassador emphasized that the 
Security Council “bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.” Lastly, he stated, “The Chinese Government vigorously calls for an 
immediate cessation of the military attacks by NATO against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.”309 
The IICK determined that despite bypassing a paralyzed UN Security Council, 
NATO alleviated a foreseen humanitarian disaster. “The intervention was justified,” the 
commission found, “because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the 
intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long 
period of oppression under Serbian rule.”310 Rice and Loomis state that “NATO violated 
the letter of the law but acted in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter.”311 
The American-led and NATO-sponsored war over Kosovo in 1999 pushed the 
norm of humanitarian intervention further along the norm life cycle. The Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), a committee endorsed by UN Secretary-
General Annan, reflected on the legality and legitimacy of the war, and found the 
intervention to be unprecedented, as it was both “illegal but legitimate.”312 Alex Bellamy 
observes that this view “accurately reflects sentiment in international society.”313 
Another author notes that there is little question that the primary motivation of NATO 
was to remove the ongoing repression of the Kosovars by the Milosevic regime.314 
Alkopher states that NATO’s war in Kosovo is a “microcosm of the events taking 
place in the larger international social structure and to a greater extent a by-product of 
them.”315 He continues stating that “human rights were conceived by leaders as universal 
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and inclusive, thus encompassing the Albanian population as well; they were also 
conceived as absolute, thus justifying—to put a stop to ethnic cleansing—the violation of 
the exclusive right of the state, in this case Serbia’s right to political and territorial 
independence.”316 NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana announced that for the first 
time, “an alliance of sovereign states fought not to conquer or preserve territory but to 
protect the values on which the alliance was founded.”317 
By the majority of the international community stating the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo was “illegal but legitimate” the intervention dramatically moved the norm of 
humanitarian intervention from the tipping point shown in the Bosnian war to the second 
stage of the norm life cycle—norm cascade. Finnemore and Sikkink state that “networks 
of norm entrepreneurs and international organizations . . . act as agents of socialization by 
pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties.”318 In this 
case, the Clinton Administration (pushed primarily by Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright) served as the norm entrepreneur and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
served as the international organization that stood up to a polarized UN Security Council 
and pressured its members and the international community to protect a minority from 
atrocities such as mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Secretary 
Albright’s role, she made her desire to threaten, and if needed to, use force against the 
Milosevic regime. In March of 1998, she stated that “we believe that in 1991 the 
international community stood by and watched ethnic cleansing [in Bosnia] . . . . We 
don’t want that to happen again this time.”319 The implication was that the Clinton 
Administration would defend the human rights of Kosovars, even with the threat of a 
Russian and Chinese veto. 
In emphasizing the role the NATO intervention had on pushing the norm of 
humanitarian intervention and human rights further along the norm life cycle, Rice and 
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Loomis declare Kosovo as “a crowning moment.”320 Within the norm cascade stage of 
the norm life cycle, Finnemore and Sikkink emphasize three possible motivations for 
responding to the “peer pressure” of a normative shift—legitimation, conformity, and 
esteem.321 Rice and Loomis note that in order for states to intervene, they risked “the 
charge of illegality in pursuit of what they deemed legitimate humanitarian 
imperatives.”322 Kosovo was a humanitarian war, waged by an international security 
organization of which the legitimacy to use force stemmed from it being an agent of the 
defense of human rights.323 Although some UN member states vigorously protested the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, “after the military campaign ended, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 1244 that in effect, legalized NATO action retroactively.”324 
It is my argument that these actions firmly placed the norm of humanitarian intervention 
into the second stage of the norm life cycle—norm cascade. 
B. R2P & KOFI ANNAN—A NORM ENTREPRENEUR AND SHIFT IN THE 
NORM LIFE CYCLE 
In 1994, the UN Security Council neglected to send troops into Rwanda in time to 
stop the murderous atrocities. Later, in 1999, NATO sidestepped the Council and waged 
war in Kosovo. To some observers, they deemed “the 78-day bombing effort as being too 
much and too early, perhaps creating as much suffering as it relieved.”325 Thomas Weiss 
notes that in both cases, the Security Council “failed to act expeditiously and authorize 
the use of deadly force to protect vulnerable populations.”326 
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In the wake of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, Secretary-General Annan 
addressed the General Assembly and asked the question: “. . . if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to 
a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect 
every precept of our common humanity?”327 In response to the Secretary-General’s 
challenge, the Canadian government, on the initiative of Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy, sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS). The commission’s initial aims were to “wrestle with the whole 
range of questions—legal, moral, operational and political—rolled up in this debate, to 
consult with the widest possible range of opinion around the world, and to bring back a 
report that would [. . .] find some new common ground.”328 The ICISS was launched in 
September 2000, and in a little more than a year, the commission published its 90-page 
report and a 400-page supplementary appendix of research essays, a bibliography, and 
background material—under the title of The Responsibility to Protect (R2P).329 
Given the disparity of views of the legitimacy of intervention across the global 
North and South, Thomas Weiss notes the ICISS was co-chaired by the former Australian 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun—a respected Algerian 
diplomat.330 In addition to Evans:  
the “North” included Lee Hamilton (USA), Michael Ignatieff (Canada), 
Klaus Naumann (Germany), Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland), and 
Gisele Cote-Harper (Canada). In addition to Sahnoun, the “South” 
included Ramesh Thakur (India), Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa), Fidel 
Ramos (Philippines), and Eduardo Stein (Guatemala). Russia’s Vladimir 
Lukin completed the group.331 
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The commission met five times and hosted eleven regional roundtables in cities 
across five continents. Gareth Evans lists them as: “Beijing, Cairo, Maputo, New Delhi, 
and Santiago in the global South, and Brussels, Geneva, London, Ottawa, Paris, St. 
Petersburg, and Washington in the North.”332 
The lesson that many draw upon from the Kosovo intervention is the “importance 
of making the Security Council work better so that it can avoid a future situation where 
the permanent members are divided on the merits of using force to end a humanitarian 
crisis.”333 From the lessons of past humanitarian operations in the 1990s, the ICISS 
report “proposed that the Council agree on the principles that should determine when 
military intervention is justifiable on humanitarian grounds.”334 
The ICISS, Bellamy notes “recommended replacing ‘the right to intervene’ debate 
with ‘the responsibility to protect’, which looks at the issue from the point of view of 
those needing help.”335 It sought to redefine the correlation between state sovereignty and 
the protection from excessive human rights abuses. The ICISS established three essential 
findings that served to shift the normative debate on humanitarian intervention in the 
international system. Firstly, having coined the “R2P” term, the commission determined 
that sovereignty implied not only a right, but a fundamental responsibility to the people 
over which state leaders are sovereign. This implies that sovereignty is a dual concept—
external as well as internal. States must respect the sovereignty of other states and 
sovereign borders, while at the same time respecting the dignity and “basic rights of all 
the people within the state.”336  
Secondly, the concept of the R2P advanced the claim that in situations that 
“shocked the conscience of mankind”—including mass starvation, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide—which a state is either unable or unwilling to prevent, “the responsibility to 
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protect the citizens from such atrocities falls to the international community.”337 Thirdly, 
the report emphasized a responsibility of the international community to rebuild the 
shattered nations in the wake of conflict, especially after international intervention. 
In addition, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
challenged the question of whether military intervention to stop violence can be deemed 
legitimate without UN Security Council authorization. Rice and Loomis note that the 
R2P report “concluded that council authorization is the gold standard of legitimacy and 
should be sought in all instances.”338 If the UN Security Council members are unable or 
unwilling to come to an agreement on the use of force, three alternatives are 
recommended by the ICISS. In lieu of a Council resolution, the Commission recommends 
UN General Assembly approval under the Uniting for Peace procedure.339 Next, Rice 
and Loomis note, “action should be taken under the jurisdiction of a relevant regional 
organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, with Security Council approval 
sought subsequently.”340 Lastly, if the Security Council neglected to act “in conscience-
shocking situations [. . .] concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the 
gravity and urgency of that situation—and that the stature and credibility of the United 
Nations may suffer thereby.”341 
Bellamy argues that the R2P norm has emerged from the rhetoric of many states 
and organizations, and has had a considerable impact on state practice.342 He emphasizes 
that since 1999, a significant number of military operations with humanitarian 
justifications have been launched without specific UN Security Council authorization.  
 
                                                 
337 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
viii. 
338 Rice and Loomis, “The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,” 
84. 
339 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 261. 
340 Rice and Loomis, “The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,” 
84. 
341 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
viii. 
342 Bellamy, “Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention,” 220. 
 80
Bellamy states, with the notable exception of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, “these 
interventions have been widely accepted as legitimate by international society.”343 The 
interventions include: 
In 2001, South African intervention in Burundi; in 2002, the multinational 
intervention in the Central African Republic, the French intervention in 
Cote d’Ivoire and the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan; and in 2003 
the African Union intervention in Burundi, the ECOWAS intervention in 
Liberia, the EU operation in Macedonia, and the Australian-led 
intervention in the Solomon Islands.344 
From the above discussion of the objectives of the R2P report and the examples of 
interventions under humanitarian precepts since 1999, one can argue that international 
society now recognizes two types of interventions. In the first, “the Security Council has 
a broad right to identify almost any human tragedy as a threat to the peace and to 
authorize enforcement action.”345 In the second, international society recognizes a much 
narrower moral—but not legal—“right of unauthorized intervention in cases of large-
scale human suffering.”346 
1. Kofi Annan—A Norm Entrepreneur and a Shift in the Norm Life 
Cycle 
Finnemore and Sikkink state that “norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm 
emergence because they call attention to issues and even “create” issues by using 
language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”347 This is precisely what 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan did as he pushed the norm of humanitarian intervention 
from the tipping point of the delayed action in the Bosnian war to the norm cascade stage 
of the air war over Kosovo. As previously stated, during the Kosovo war, Annan asserted 
that the UN Security Council was solely responsible for authorizing nondefensive 
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military force; however, he acknowledged that “there are times when the use of force 
may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace.”348 Annan endorsed the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo’s finding that the U.S.-led war in Kosovo was 
“illegal but legitimate.”349 
The Secretary-General emphasized the norm of humanitarian intervention in 
calculated steps before sponsoring the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty. In 1998, Annan professed: “The Charter protects the sovereignty of 
peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and 
human dignity. Sovereignty means responsibility, not just power.”350 Already, Annan 
implied that the systematic violations of human rights could degrade a state’s 
sovereignty.351  
The Secretary General’s next step in the norm emergence process came in 
September 1999 when he published a controversial article in the The Economist titled 
“Two Concepts of Sovereignty.” Weiss states Annan’s “black-and-white challenge to 
traditional state sovereignty emerges from changing the balance between states and 
people as the source of legitimate authority.” He continues that the two concepts of 
sovereignty “helped launch the intense debate on the legitimacy of intervention on 
humanitarian grounds.”352 More specifically, Annan’s controversial article stated: 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by 
the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now 
widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and 
not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean 
the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of 
the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a  
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renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read 
the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to 
protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.353 
Even before Annan addressed the General Assembly in September 2000 and 
asked the question: “. . . how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica . . ?” and 
the Canadian government sponsored the ICISS project, the Secretary-General was setting 
the scene for the presentation of a new policy on intervention. In the Millennium Report, 
presented to the UN General Assembly on April 23, 2000, the Secretary-General 
declared: 
We must protect vulnerable people by finding better ways to enforce 
humanitarian and human rights law, and to ensure that gross violations do 
not go unpunished. National sovereignty offers vital protection to small 
and weak States, but it should not be a shield for crimes against humanity. 
In extreme cases the clash of these two principles confronts us with a real 
dilemma, and the Security Council may have a moral duty to act on behalf 
of the international community.354 
Annan, by presenting these comments to the General Assembly before the ICISS 
project was underway, was arguably able to maneuver the outcome in the direction of his 
choosing. In December 2001, as the ICISS report was published, Annan, having won the 
Nobel Prize for Peace, used his Nobel Lecture to argue that “the sovereignty of states 
must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights.”355  
Thakur states that “the roots of the R2P lay in statements by Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan; R2P itself is directed primarily at the UN policy community in New York; it 
gives pride of place to the UN if the international community is to honor its international 
responsibility to protect; and, if R2P is to be the basis of a new international consensus, 
this can only come about in the UN forum.”356 The ICISS report also delivered in  
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December 2001 continues Annan’s focus as it “provides a fresh conceptual template for 
reconciling both the tension in principle between sovereignty and intervention, and the 
divergent interests and perspectives in political practice.”357 
In September 2003, Secretary-General Annan addressed the General Assembly 
and indicated that the organization had “come to a fork in the road, presenting member 
states with a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was 
founded.”358 The fork in the road was undoubtedly the U.S. doctrine of preemption and 
the subsequent U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.359 To examine the foreseen challenges ahead, 
Annan announced the formation of a High Level Panel of “eminent personalities with a 
broad mandate to examine today’s global threats and provide an analysis of future 
challenges to international peace and security.”360  
The panel’s report, published in December 2004, titled A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, endorses the norm of humanitarian intervention as a 
collective international responsibility to protect people from mass atrocities. The report 
recommended guidelines governing the use of force. These guidelines have a striking 
resemblance to those proposed in the ICISS’s R2P report. Annan supported the panel’s 
recommendation that the UN Security Council and the General Assembly adopt its 
guidelines on the use of force. The report A More Secure World stated 
The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated 
attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but their 
responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international 
community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right 
to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” of every State 
when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe—mass 
murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and 
deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing 
acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary 
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responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when 
they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up 
by the wider international community.”361 
As demonstrated here, the High Level Panel’s report indicates a strong and clear 
support for the norm of R2P. Gareth Evans, co-chair of the ICISS commission, was 
appointed a member of the High-Level Panel. Evans notes that over half of the sixteen-
member panel was from the global South, and there was “remarkably ready acceptance of 
the vitality and utility of the basic principles.”362 The panel included former Norwegian 
prime minister Gro Harlem Brudtland, British diplomat Sir David Hannay, former U.S. 
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, High Commissioner Refugees Sadako Ogata, 
former Organization of African Unity secretary-general Salim Salim, Satish Nabiar of 
India, and former vice premier and foreign minister of China, Qian Qichen. It is 
important to note the diversity of the panel both in geographic parameters and in 
ideological scope; for example, the U.S. representative, Brent Scowcroft is known as a 
stanch realist. Evans also emphasizes the role the Chinese representative played in the 
panel. Evans states, “without his immense prestige back in Beijing, it is difficult to 
believe that, given the traditional strength of its concerns about nonintervention, China 
would have been quite as relaxed on this issue as it proved to be at the [2005 UN] World 
Summit.”363 
In Evans’ recent book describing the evolution of R2P, he acknowledges his good 
fortune to having been appointed to the key panel in 2003 that continued to push the 
normative language of R2P.364 Evans states “the critical link between the ICISS report 
and the [UN Sixtieth Anniversary World] Summit outcome document was the work of  
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the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.”365 
Furthermore, Evans notes the crucial recommendation was expressed in terms of a 
Responsibility to Protect: 
The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective 
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council 
authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide 
and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of 
humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or 
unwilling to prevent.366 
The High-Level Panel’s report did not address what should be done when the UN 
Security Council is at loggerheads and does not act. Subsequently, to continue to push the 
norm of R2P, in March 2005, the Secretary-General published his own report, In Larger 
Freedom. Annan’s report built on the High-Level Panel’s A More Secure World, and 
prepared the stage for the upcoming UN sixtieth anniversary summit.367 In his report 
presented to the UN General Assembly, the Secretary-General stated: 
I urge all states to agree to strengthen the rule of law, human rights and 
democracy in concrete ways. In particular, I ask states to embrace the 
principle of the “Responsibility to Protect,” as a basis for collective action 
against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity—
recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each 
individual state, but also that, if national authorities are unable or 
unwilling to protect their citizens, the responsibility then shifts to the 
international community; and that, in the last resort, the United Nations 
Security Council may take enforcement action according to the Charter.368 
The Secretary-General emphasized that the challenge for states was not to work around 
the Security Council but to make the council system work in future decision making for 
the better of international society. Annan knew he had pushed the norm further, as he  
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states in the report that “while I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue [. 
. .] I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we 
must act on it.”369 
The UN World Summit gathered in September 2005 to commemorate the sixtieth 
anniversary of the United Nations. More than 150 heads of state and governments, 
presidents, and prime ministers gathered in New York City. Evans notes that for many 
months prior to the summit, tense “in-house wrangling” took place “about nearly every 
one of Annan’s sixty or so recommendations.”370 The Secretary-General’s R2P 
recommendation survived almost unscathed. The Summit Declaration stated: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. [. . .] 
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States 
to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability.371 
Thus, the UN Summit Declaration of 2005 adopted by the General Assembly declared 
that the UN has the responsibility to protect populations from man-made atrocities. 
Furthermore, the General Assembly agreed, stating: 
We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner 
through the Security Council in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
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Although the UN World Summit document uses the phrase “responsibility to 
protect,” some scholars note a key difference between it and Annan’s report In Larger 
Freedom.373 The ICISS and Annan’s In Larger Freedom states “if national authorities are 
unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, the responsibility then shifts to the 
international community.” The UN World Summit document does not make such a 
reference to the responsibility of the international community.  
Evans does not see any significance to omitting the above phrase, as the summit 
document does not diverge from the core R2P principles in any significant way. He states 
the “unanimous agreement on this language at the World Summit was an enormous 
achievement by the many diplomats who worked to craft it” and emphasizes that the 
document “should be seen absolutely as an occasion for celebration rather than 
disappointment by supporters of the responsibility to protect norm.”374 The only 
disappointing omission from the World Summit Outcome document, as noted by Evans, 
is “the failure to adopt any criteria for the use of military force, leaving the argument for 
such guidelines to be made another day.”375 In April 2006, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1674 and reaffirmed the R2P principles. This remains the current 
reflection of R2P as UN policy. 
It would be hard for one not to call Annan a norm entrepreneur for his work 
pushing the norm of humanitarian intervention and subsequently the norm of R2P along 
the contours of the second stage of the norm life cycle—norm cascade. James Traub in 
his work on Kofi Annan in the UN, notes John Ruggie (an international relations theorist 
and key advisor to Annan) describing the Secretary-General as “a ‘norm entrepreneur’ 
who understood precisely when and how far he could press a large and controversial 
principle, whether the universality of human rights or the doctrine of intervention.”376 
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Finnemore and Sikkink note that norm entrepreneurs need an organizational platform, 
which in this case was the Secretariat of the UN.377 Weiss notes “Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s own use of the bully pulpit is also an essential chapter in the story, and the 
acknowledgement by the 2005 World Summit (preceded by the work of the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes) of R2P has reinforced the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention as a policy option.”378 Continuing his emphasis on Annan 
using his influence to advance the normative shift of R2P, Weiss notes “more than his 
predecessors, Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997-2006) took human rights seriously 
and preached about humanitarian intervention from his bully pulpit. A series of speeches 
in 1998-99 are widely viewed as having placed the issue squarely on the 
intergovernmental agenda.”379 
C. CONCLUSION 
Annan pushed the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention onto the doorstep 
of the third stage of the norm life cycle—norm internalization. He did this by articulating 
the emphasis away from the right and duty of humanitarian intervention to the 
responsibility of a state to protect its citizens. Thakur states “where humanitarian 
intervention raises fears of domination based on the international power hierarchy, R2P 
encapsulates the element of international solidarity.”380 He continues, noting the dynamic 
of R2P to refocus “the international searchlight back on the duty to protect the villager 
from murder, the woman from rape, and the child from starvation and being 
orphaned.”381  
Annan shouldered the mantle of the norm of R2P while persuading others to 
discuss and argue the concept. He did this in a series of steps. Firstly, with the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo determining the humanitarian war as 
                                                 
377 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 899. 
378 Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, 89. 
379 Ibid., 96. 
380 Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security, 251. 
381 Ibid. 
 89
illegal but legitimate. Secondly, with the publication of a controversial article in The 
Economist titled “Two Concepts of Sovereignty.” Thirdly, the Secretary-General 
sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Before 
the ICISS document Responsibility to Protect was published, he used his Millennium 
Report and then his Nobel Lecture as an opportunity to argue that “the sovereignty of 
states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights.”382 After 
the ICISS’s R2P report was published, Annan continued to emphasize its key points. This 
was first done by his creation of the High-Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change 
and by appointing one of the ICISS co-chairs—Gareth Evans—to the panel. For this 
maneuver, Thakur states, “Annan has also been uniquely skilled in norm generation and 
entrepreneurship. One technique for the transmission of ideas into international policy is 
by means of blue-ribbon international commissions.”383 Fourthly, the Secretary-General 
presented the R2P norm in his own report, In Larger Freedom. Fifthly, in 2005, Annan 
articulated the key R2P principles into the UN World Summit Declaration. Finally, in 
April 2006, the Secretary-General pressed the UN Security Council to reaffirm the R2P 
principles, “giving it additional weight under international law in UNSC Resolution 
1674.”384 It is my argument that the addition of the norm of R2P in the UN World 
Summit Declaration and the authorization of UN Security Council Resolution 1674 has 
firmly planted this norm over the threshold and into the third and final stage of the norm 
life cycle-norm internalization. 
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VI.  R2P IN THE THIRD STAGE OF THE NORM LIFE CYCLE: A 
CLOSER LOOK AT THE 2005 UN WORLD SUMMIT 
The last chapter ended with a description of the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan pushing the norm of R2P, as a norm entrepreneur, from inception with the 
launching of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to 
unanimous adoption of the principle of responsibility to protect by the UN General 
Assembly at the 2005 World Summit. With respect to the norm life cycle of humanitarian 
intervention and responsibility to protect, the adoption of the principles of R2P by the UN 
suggests that the norm has cascaded and is currently in the third and final stage—norm 
internalization. 
However, although the norm has entered the final stage, it is still has room to 
grow achieving what Finnemore and Sikkink describe as “a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality 
that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic.”385 This chapter will 
demonstrate that although the principles of responsibility to protect were unanimously 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2005, the norm of humanitarian 
intervention has not been widely internalized. 
This chapter will be in four parts. The first section will investigate how the three 
most vocal and powerful players in the UN—Russia, China, and the United States—view 
R2P and specifically sovereignty as a responsibility prior to the 2005 UN World Summit. 
The second section will investigate how the Non-Aligned-Movement (NAM), the Group 
of 77 (G-77), South America, the EU, and the AU, perceive the responsibility to protect. 
Next, the chapter will look at remarks made by Russian and Chinese leaders since the 
2005 UN World Summit Declaration. Lastly, the chapter will identify supporters of the 
norm and discuss remarks made by them at key meetings within the UN, specifically 
statements from government leaders, officials of regional intergovernmental  
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organizations, ambassadors to the United Nations, and scholars from particular non-
governmental organization (NGOs) that have analyzed the progress of the principles of 
responsibility to protect since its inception with the ICISS report in December 2001.  
A. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT NORM: VIEWS OF RUSSIA, 
CHINA, AND THE U.S. 
The greatest challenges to the principles of R2P, prior to the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Declaration, came from Russia, China, and the United States. The first 
challenge concerns criteria or precautionary principles to determine the use of force. The 
High-Level Panel commissioned by Secretary-General Annan determined the 
precautionary principles for military intervention as: “proper purpose (right intention), 
last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences (likelihood of success).”386 
Wheeler notes, “the fact that Russian and Chinese representatives on the High-Level 
Panel were prepared to accept such language, when their governments had opposed 
British attempts in 1999-2000 to reach an agreement on criteria in the [Security] Council” 
is a significant achievement.387 This statement in the High-Level Panel is matched by a 
further compromise agreement among the members of the Panel that the use of force 
would have to be authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII provision.  
Continuing the momentum, the Secretary-General’s In Larger Freedom pressed 
for the Security Council to agree to a set of guidelines for intervention. Annan’s In 
Larger Freedom stated there should be a “common view on the seriousness of the threat; 
proper purpose proportionally; and a reasonable chance of success.”388 The Secretary-
General noted in his report that the R2P principles added a set of criteria for intervention, 
and thus would “add transparency to [Security Council] deliberations and make its 
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decisions more likely to be respected, by both governments and world public opinion.”389 
The 2005 World Summit Declaration, however, omits a set of precautionary principles or 
criteria for military intervention.  
Before diplomats and scholars of Annan’s High-Level Panel met, discussions of 
R2P took place among the five permanent members of the Security Council at their 2002 
annual retreat. Alex Bellamy states, “the United States rejected the idea of criteria on the 
grounds that it could not offer pre-commitments to engage its military where it had no 
national interests, and that it would not bind itself to criteria that would constrain its right 
to decide when and where to use force.”390 China and Russia had different fears. China 
insisted that all issues relating to military intervention be deferred to the Security 
Council, and Russia and China opposed setting criteria that could lead to increased UN 
humanitarian intervention. Russia argued that “the UN was already equipped to deal with 
humanitarian crises, and suggested that, by countenancing unauthorized intervention,” 
R2P risked undermining the UN Charter.391 Wheeler states, “the combined opposition of 
these states killed any attempt to develop agreed guidelines at the summit.”392  
The lack of inclusion of criteria for military intervention in the Summit 
Declaration is of little surprise. Between February 2004 and July 2006, the Brookings 
Institution organized a series of regionally based roundtable events for a project titled 
“Force and Legitimacy” to discuss the theory and application of the principles of the 
responsibility to protect. Susan Rice, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and 
Andrew Loomis, Lecturer at Georgetown University, describe the nuanced attitudes of 
the participants (experts from the United States, Europe, Mexico, China, South Asia, the  
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Middle East, and Africa).393 The participants of the discussions were former government 
officials, academics and scholars. They discussed the question of “when is it legitimate 
and appropriate to use force in international affairs.”394  
Rice and Loomis point out, “while conversations in small groups of experts 
cannot be extrapolated to serve as indicators of entire national attitudes, the conversations 
do shed light on how policy elites in different countries approach the responsibility to 
protect.”395 Furthermore, the authors note that “most international interlocutors embraced 
R2P, at least in principle; however, they differed substantially over its importance, 
urgency, appropriate threshold for action, and whether prior UN Security Council 
approval of intervention was necessary.”396  
These interpretations run parallel to those described by Ramesh Thakur from a 
roundtable discussion of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty in Beijing in June 2001 and in St. Petersburg in July 2001.397 Thakur notes 
that the Chinese delegates, which also included former government officials and 
academics, took the “hardest line against intervention and in defense of sovereignty.”398 
The summary of the discussions states quite clearly that the views of the Chinese present 
depicted “the conceptualization of humanitarian intervention is a total fallacy” and 
“actions of humanitarian intervention pose grave problems for international law and 
international relations.”399 The opposition from the Chinese delegates at the ICISS 
roundtable is not surprising in light of their strong resentment over the NATO campaign 
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against Kosovo. While the International Independent Commission on Kosovo declared 
the humanitarian action “illegal but legitimate,” both Russia and China made their 
objections clear.400  
Similarly, the summary of the ICISS roundtable meeting in St. Petersburg present 
an unequivocal feeling of hostility from the Russian participants. The ICISS summary 
states: 
A discussion paper was presented [by the Russian delegates] that gave an 
objective analysis of Russia’s generally negative position on interventions 
of all kinds. Recently, concern has arisen over Western unilateralism, 
which has characterized some interventions in the past decade and has 
seen the Security Council sidelined and double standards involved.401 
The summary paper discussed Russia’s emphasis on sovereignty. It stated, “the central 
point was that while understandings of sovereignty might have changed, the basic rules 
are still there and are still the organizing principle for international relations.”402 It is 
important to note that the delegates recognized that the norm of state sovereignty has had 
to loosen its grip in order for the norm of humanitarian intervention to take hold. This is 
evident in two statements made in the ICISS roundtable summary report from St. 
Petersburg. Firstly, the report states, “The central point [during a discussion on 
sovereignty] was that while understandings of sovereignty might have changed, the basic 
rules are still there and are still the organizing principle for international relations.”403 
Secondly, the report notes the Russian delegates’ emphasis that “the Russian Constitution 
seems to give priority to human rights over sovereignty, as it stipulates that international 
law should prevail when there is a conflict with national law.”404 However, despite 
prompting by the ICISS Commissioners, “there was no discussion by the Russian 
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delegates at the roundtable of the “responsibility to protect” theme being considered by 
the ICISS. The summary notes do acknowledge that “the Russian Constitution seems to 
give priority to human rights over sovereignty, as it stipulates that international law 
should prevail when there is a conflict with national law.”405  
Russia and China, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, continued 
to insist on the paramount role of the Security Council. The Chinese roundtable delegates 
claimed that “there is no basis for it in the UN Charter which recognizes only self-
defense and the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security as 
legitimate grounds for the use of force.”406 One Russian participant noted that “the 
“Uniting for Peace” procedure might not be liked by the P-5 [five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council] including Russia, but that it would certainly be preferred by 
most of the remaining 184 members of the UN.”407 The Russian delegate’s statement 
demonstrates that R2P and human rights have a place over and above the veto power of 
the Security Council. However, the Chinese delegates rejected the assertion that the rights 
of people transcend the rights of states. They asserted that “humanitarian intervention is a 
fallacious concept, tantamount to marrying evil to good. Humanitarianism is an 
admirable virtue, but intervention is a red herring and widely condemned by the 
world.”408 
The United States remained opposed to any guidelines or a set of criteria that 
might constrain its freedom of action (or inaction) when it came to the use force.409 
During the ICISS roundtable in Washington, D.C., the American delegates—who 
included Senator Chuck Hagel and two junior members of the State Department along 
with more than twenty others from various prominent think tanks and NGOs—noted the  
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“debate in the U.S. is not so much as over whether there is a responsibility to intervene, 
but whether there is an obligation to do so.”410 The summary also emphasized a need to 
follow a more consistent application of values. The roundtable panelists stated: 
Changing the terms of the debate to a “responsibility to protect,” as 
suggested by ICISS, was greeted positively. It widens the scope of 
discussion, since local actors, including the government of the country that 
is the subject of possible intervention, also have a responsibility to protect. 
In some cases, moreover, these actors also have greater authority than 
international ones. Defining the success of an action or intervention is also 
easier if protection is the central focus. One participant said that ICISS 
should stress the point about local actors having primary responsibility to 
protect. Otherwise, there is the risk that people would automatically start 
looking outside their own borders for others to protect them.411 
Having ironed out, and as one scholar notes—watered-down—most of the critical 
issues of the principles of R2P before the commencement of the 2005 UN World 
Summit, both Russia and China were very cordial during the event.412 The People’s 
Republic of China’s Position Paper on UN Reform, 2005 stated “we need a consensus on 
the responsibility to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. To this end, force should only be used when all other means have failed.”413 
The Chinese ambassador purposely kept the terms vague, stressing the importance of 
using other means before employing force. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the 
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emphasized the sanctity of the Security Council to “further strengthen the authority and 
legitimacy of the United Nations as well as its capability to respond more effectively to 
the challenges of the 21st century.”415  
B. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT NORM: VIEWS OF THE NON-
ALIGNED MOVEMENT, LATIN AMERICA, EUROPE, AND SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
1. Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77   
Prior to the summit, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-
77) expressed strong reservations concerning R2P. Bellamy states that India “argued that 
the council was already sufficiently empowered to act in humanitarian emergencies and 
observed that the failure to act in the past was caused by a lack of political will, not a lack 
of authority.”416 Malaysian minister, Radzi Rahman, speaking on behalf of the NAM at 
the plenary meeting of the Draft Outcome Document three months before the World 
Summit, argued that R2P potentially represented a reincarnation of humanitarian 
intervention. Specifically, Rahman and the NAM stated: 
The Ministers reaffirmed the commitment of the Non-Aligned Movement 
to the United Nations Charter and underscored the need to preserve and 
promote its principles and purposes, including the principles of respect for 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States. In this regard, they reiterated the rejection by the 
Movement of the so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, which has 
no basis either in the Charter or in international law. . . . They also 
observed similarities between the new expression “responsibility to 
protect” and “humanitarian intervention” and requested the Co-ordinating 
Bureau to carefully study and consider the expression “responsibility to 
protect” and its implications on the basis of the principles of non-
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integrity and national sovereignty of States, bearing in mind the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international 
humanitarian law.417 
Speaking five months before the World Summit, on the behalf of the Group of 77, 
Stafford Neil of Jamaica, did not offer a joint position on R2P; however, he did suggest 
that the report ought to be revised to emphasize the principles of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.418 Mr. Neil stated, “the recommendations that we [the G-77] support and the 
decisions we take will be geared to strengthen multilateralism, to uphold the principles of 
international law and policies which promote equity and protect the rights and interests of 
all states.”419 Significantly, the statement from the G-77 emphasizes the role of 
sovereignty over human rights. 
2. Latin America 
Some Latin American states demonstrated their caution towards the R2P 
principles prior to the World Summit. Christine Gray notes that those Latin American and 
Caribbean nations that are generally hostile to the United States were initially opposed to 
R2P. Cuba stated, “It would be suicidal to endorse the so-called ‘right to intervention,’ 
which had been invoked recently in circumstances of a unipolar global order, 
characterized by an economic and military dictatorship by a super-power seeking to 
impose its own model of society.”420 Gray notes that Venezuela also expressed suspicion 
stating, “The responsibility to protect was supposed to be a starting point for protecting 
against genocide and other human rights violations, while in reality, it aimed at seizing 
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the right to adopt coercive measures against states in the South.”421 Prior to affirming in 
favor of the Summit Declaration, at the 2005 UN World Summit, President Hugo Chavez 
Frias of Venezuela had these words to say: 
Let’s not allow a handful of countries try to reinterpret with impunity the 
principles of the International Law to give way to doctrines like 
“Preemptive War”, how do they threaten us with preemptive war!, and the 
now so called “Responsibility to Protect”, but we have to ask ourselves 
who is going to protect us, how are they going to protect us?422 
Not all Latin American nations were as hostile or as vocal as Chavez of 
Venezuela. Peruvian Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales stated in January 2007, at the 
Security Council debate on Threats to International Peace and Security: 
The threat of the recurrence of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity has sharpened our resolve to recognize that we 
have a responsibility to protect people from such scourges. Thus States, 
Members of the United Nations, including Council members, must be 
vigilant in order to fulfill our mandate to protect peoples when the State 
concerned is unable to do so or unwilling to comply with its 
obligations.423 
Argentine Ambassador Garcia Moritan spoke in favor of the principles of R2P.  Less than 
a year after the summit, he emphasized: 
in the case of the protection for civilians, the considerations of a 
mechanism of this nature could also mean an initial step regarding the 
implementation of the final part of paragraph 138 of the Outcome 
Document of the 2005 Summit that indicates that the international 
community must support the United Nations to establish an early warning 
capability regarding the responsibility to protect.424 
Thakur notes that in the twentieth century, Latin America was the most frequent recipient 
of intervention by the United States. Their skepticism of R2P, he says is not 
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unwarranted.425 He quotes Maria Soledad Alvear of Chile during the ICISS Round Table 
in Santiago in May 2001 stating, “For Chile, the United Nations Charter constitutes the 
only possible legal framework, the condition sine qua non, governing humanitarian 
intervention.”426 Lastly, Thakur notes that most of the Latin American countries came to 
agree on the principles of R2P primarily concurring “that the UNSC is the most 
acceptable institution for authorizing intervention, but disagreed on what was permissible 
when circumstances called for intervention but the Council failed to act.”427 
3. Europe 
The key objective of the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 is stability.428 
Felix Berenskoetter emphasizes that the ESS has significant humanitarian normative 
underpinnings and includes a responsibility for a level of international security. The ESS 
explicitly notes that in order to create and maintain a peaceful continent, the ESS has the 
“responsibility for promoting political order in the EU’s immediate neighborhood, as it is 
in the European interest that countries on our borders are well governed.”429 
Furthermore, the author highlights the ESS’s “repeated voicing of responsibility for 
strengthening international law and multilateral order as an end in itself.”430 Lastly, the 
ESS emphasizes cooperation as a normative goal when “delegating the primary 
responsibility for international security to the UN Security Council.”431 
European participants supported Secretary-General Annan’s plea for the 
principles of R2P and its appropriate application. Rice and Loomis note that the European 
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countries agreed that “the lack of political will and of international peace enforcement 
capacity were the most significant factors inhibiting effective international action rather 
than the constraints of international law.”432 The lack of political will is exacerbated by 
the impression that the European Union’s (EU) security and defense capabilities are still 
under development.433 Concerning the EU’s military capability for humanitarian 
intervention, a British House of Commons research paper dated June 2008 states: 
In 2003 the EU agreed to create European Union Battlegroups (EU BGs) 
which became fully operational on January 1, 2007. Each of the fifteen 
Battlegroups is made up of 1500 troops under EU control. The aim was for 
the EU to be able to deploy an autonomous operation within 15 days in 
response to a crisis. The forces are to have the capability to operate under 
a Chapter VII mandate and could be deployed in response to a UN request 
to stabilize a situation or otherwise meet a short-term need until 
peacekeepers from the United Nations, or regional organization acting 
under a UN mandate, could arrive or be reinforced.434 
David Mepham and Alexander Ramsbotham argue that the new European Union 
Battlegroups appear to be highly relevant for instances when a rapid military intervention 
for humanitarian protection purposes is needed in Africa.435 The authors note that the 
December 2005 EU Strategy for Africa “pledged to deploy operations involving EU 
Battlegroups to promote African peace and security.”436  
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The EU’s support for humanitarian intervention and the principles of R2P was 
evident at the UN General Assembly’s debate over Annan’s In Larger Freedom. 
Speaking on behalf of the Union, Jean-Marc Hoscheit of Luxembourg stated that he 
shared the Secretary-General’s view that development, security and human rights went 
hand in hand. Furthermore:  
maintenance of international peace and security, and promotion and 
protection of human rights were core missions of the United Nations. . . . 
The Union was strongly resolved to pursue effective multilateralism, with 
the United Nations at its center, as emphasized in the European security 
strategy.437 
Mr. Hoscheit continued, emphasizing the EU’s support for military action in cases of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing, specifically stating: 
flagrant human rights violations and acts of genocide call for a strong 
international response. In that regard, the Union emphasizes strengthening 
the rule of law at national and international levels, as well as combating 
impunity. It also stresses its support for the International Criminal Court 
and other war crimes tribunals, and called for Member States to cooperate. 
. . . The Union is a strong supporter of the United Nations reform, with the 
objective of strengthening the international community’s capacity to face 
new threats and the broad spectrum of present-day challenges.438 
Given the opportunity to represent their respective nations, other European ambassadors 
to the UN were more specific in their support for R2P. Ambassador Johan Lovald of 
Norway stated “when a State ignores its responsibility towards its population, the 
international community must not remain passive.”439 Mr. Lovald continued, “Norway 
endorses the Secretary-General’s appeal to embrace the principle of the responsibility to 
protect as a norm of collective actions in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”440 The French ambassador also expressed his support stating, “the 
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promotion of the dignity of people was something that was a crucial part of the United 
Nations’ mission. That dimension is gaining ever greater importance in today’s world. 
France believes in the responsibility to protect.”441 Lastly, Iceland’s ambassador 
emphasized, “in order to achieve human dignity, States must be ready to embrace the 
responsibility to protect.”442  
One stumbling block, noted by many scholars, for building a consensus among 
some European and especially developing nations during the run-up to the 2005 UN 
World Summit were humanitarian arguments proclaimed by the United States and Great 
Britain to justify the invasion of Iraq.443 The concern among Europeans, and African and 
Asian states, in particular, is that an identified criteria defined by the UNSC “would be 
used by the powerful to justify armed intervention against the weak.”444 Evans suggests 
that the “poorly and inconsistently” argued humanitarian justifications for the war in Iraq 
“almost choked at birth what many were hoping was an emerging new norm justifying 
intervention on the basis of the principles of ‘responsibility to protect.’”445 David Clark, 
former special advisor to the British Foreign Office, declared that “Iraq has wrecked our 
case for humanitarian wars. As long as U.S. power remains in the hands of the 
Republican right, it will be impossible to build a consensus on the left behind the idea 
that it can be a power for good.”446 Furthermore, Clark argues that, “Those who continue 
to insist that it can, risk discrediting the concept of humanitarian intervention.”447 
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In order to face the increasing skepticism and questions concerning the political 
uses of R2P, supporters of sovereignty as a responsibility chose to emphasize the 
restraining aspects of the use of force suggested in the document. Bellamy notes that 
Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin “insisted that intervention should be authorized by 
the Security Council . . . and stressed that the threshold for action be set high—higher, in 
fact, than the actual practice of the Security Council in the 1990s.”448 Specifically, in 
supporting the principles of R2P in reference to the situation in the Darfur region of 
Sudan, Prime Minister Martin stated “what we see is the evolution of international law 
and practice so that multilateral action may be taken in situations of extreme 
humanitarian emergency.”449 Martin continues stating, “The Security Council should 
establish new thresholds for when the international community judges that civilian 
populations face extreme threats; for exploring non-military and, if necessary, 
proportionate military options to protect civilians. The responsibility to protect is not a 
license for intervention; it is an international guarantor of political accountability.”450 
With such strong forces against the R2P principles and further divisiveness in the 
UN over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is remarkable that a unanimous consensus on the 
R2P principles was produced at the UN World Summit Declaration in September 2005. 
Bellamy notes that the consensus was due to four factors: 
The approach taken by the Canadian government and the ICISS 
commissioners to selling the concept; its adoption by the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and, subsequently, Kofi Annan 
in his program for renewing the UN; the emergence of an African 
consensus on the principles of the responsibility to protect; and the 
advocacy of a high-profile U.S. report on UN reform written by George 
Mitchell and Newt Gingrich.451 
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The next section will demonstrate the importance of the support from the African 
Union in the development of the norm of R2P. 
4. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Remarkably, in the end, what carried the Responsibility to Protect to adoption at 
the Summit was the “persistent advocacy by sub-Saharan African countries, led by South 
Africa, and supplemented by a clear—and historically quite significant—embrace of 
limited-sovereignty principles by the key Latin American countries.”452 Evans notes the 
personal diplomatic efforts made by Prime Minister Martin towards leaders of major 
indecisive countries in Asia and India in particular.453 The advocacy of the sub-Saharan 
states began in 2003, with the creation of the African Union (AU) from the ashes of the 
Organization for African Unity (OAU). Under the Constitutive Act of the AU Charter, 
African leaders awarded the members a right of humanitarian intervention. Article 4(h) 
states, “The Union shall function in accordance with the principles: (h) the right of the 
Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect 
of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”454 
Article 4(j) declares, “the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union 
in order to restore peace and security.”455 The apparently contradictory language in 
article 4(g) emphasizing “non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of 
another” reinforces the AU’s rejection of unilateral intervention in favor of collective 
action from the AU.456 Bellamy notes that the significance of Article 4 “lies in the 
assertion that the AU need not defer to the UN Security Council in humanitarian 
emergencies . . . [and] therefore, the AU created an institutional mechanism that permits 
the regional arrangements foreseen by The Responsibility to Protect.”457  
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Not every African nation whole-heartedly adopted the principles of R2P. For 
example, speaking to the World Summit General Assembly, President Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe stated: 
The vision that we must present for a future United Nations should not be 
one filled with vague concepts that provide an opportunity for those states 
that seek to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Concepts such 
as “humanitarian intervention” and the “responsibility to protect” need 
careful scrutiny in order to test the motives of their proponents.458 
However, most African leaders did speak in favor of R2P. President Festus Mogae of 
Botswana praised R2P at the Summit saying:  
Guaranteeing the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is one aspect of the UN’s broader mandate to protect our 
populations. We can no longer afford to stand back if a country fails to 
protect its citizens against grave human rights abuses. In this respect, we 
embrace the concept of “responsibility to protect.”459 
Most telling, at the 2005 UN World Summit, Rwandan President Paul Kagame stated: 
Let me stress the importance of our collective responsibility to deal with 
terrorism, and to protect populations under threat of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Never again should the 
international community’s response to these crimes be found wanting. Let 
us resolve to take collective actions in a timely and decisive manner. Let 
us also commit to put in place early warning mechanisms and ensure that 
preventive interventions are the rule rather than the exception.460 
As previously stated, Bellamy notes that consensus for the UN Summit 
Declaration was due to four factors, and the fourth was “the advocacy of a high-profile 
U.S. report on UN reform written by George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich.”461 As noted, 
the American position with the language of R2P and the subsequent UN Summit 
Declaration concerned two issues—being compelled to deploy forces and that a set of 
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precautionary principles may prohibit the United States from acting. In 2004, former U.S. 
Congressmen George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich led a task force organized by the U.S. 
Institute of Peace to research U.S. interests in Annan’s UN reforms and specifically his 
High-Level Panel outcome, A More Secure World. The task force argued in favor of the 
principles of R2P. Challenging the emerging consensus that humanitarian intervention 
should be authorized by the Security Council, the task force argued that the failure of the 
Council to act “must not be used as an excuse by concerned members to avoid protective 
measures.”462 The task force determined it legitimate for states to act outside the UN 
framework when the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe warranted immediate 
intervention. Furthermore, Bellamy notes, the Mitchell-Gingrich report “laid the 
groundwork for a renewed U.S. engagement with The Responsibility to Protect.”463 
Carsten Stahn notes that the “final text of the Outcome Document is a 
compromise solution that seeks to bridge the different positions.” He continues, 
“paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document represent a rather curious mixture of 
political and legal considerations, which reflects the continuing division and confusion 
about the meaning of the concept.”464 The first of the two paragraphs begins with the 
straightforward statement that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”465 Furthermore, to reconcile the strongly anti-interventionist countries—
particularly Russia, China, and India—the draft outcome document “placed the 
responsibility to protect squarely in the domain of the Security Council.”466 
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C. RUSSIAN AND CHINESE STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS SINCE THE 
2005 UN WORLD SUMMIT 
Chinese and Russian officials continued to demonstrate their belief in the 
importance of the UN Security Council since the 2005 UN World Summit. In December 
2006, Chinese Ambassador Liu Zhenmin emphasized the need for more discussion and 
caution. Speaking to the General Assembly, he stated:  
In discussing the issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the 
Security Council should continue to approach with caution the concept of 
the responsibility to protect. The World Summit Outcome last year gave 
an extensive and very cautious representation of the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity, and went on to request the General Assembly to 
continue to explore this concept. As many Member States have expressed 
their concern and misgivings in that regard, we believe that it is not 
appropriate to expand, willfully interpret or even abuse this concept.467 
Liu is referring to the watered down compromise solution that was authorized at the 
2005 World Summit Declaration. The Russian Ambassador, Igor Shcherbak 
demonstrated the lack of the internalization of the R2P norm when he stated “it is to be 
expected that the concept of the responsibility to protect has not yet become a reality 
today specifically because in its present form it does not enjoy sufficiently broad support 
from Member States.”468 Mr. Shcherbak continued by stating that Russia “would once 
again like to emphasize that, under this concept, the primary responsibility lies with 
national Governments, whose efforts must be supported by the international community 
without undermining State sovereignty.” 
In June 2007, Counselor to China’s mission to the UN Li Junhua stated: 
The concept of the “responsibility to protect” should be understood and 
applied correctly. At present, there are still various understandings and 
interpretations about this concept by many member states. Therefore the 
Security Council should refrain from invoking the concept of “the 
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responsibility to protect.” Still less should the concept be abused. The 
Security Council should respect and support the General Assembly to 
continue to discuss about the concept, in order to reach broad 
consensus.469 
Both Chinese representatives emphasize continued discussion and debate. 
In a subsequent panel in April 2007 titled “Darfur at a Crossroads: Global Public 
Opinion and the Responsibility to Protect,” sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Rice 
describes the interaction of the Chinese members of the roundtable discussions: “in the 
case of China, there was an interesting acceptance in principle of the notion of the 
responsibility to protect,” however, “when it came down to any specific case, most 
notably Darfur—but, frankly, any case—that agreement in principle eroded, evaporated 
into no, we can’t possibly agree to that.”470 Rice also notes that the Chinese participants 
“suggested that there should be a high threshold for international action (for example, that 
half the population be affected) and that irrefutable evidence of genocide or mass 
atrocities be gathered and presented by ‘objective analysts.’”471 This suggests the 
principles of R2P are interpreted in very narrow terms by the Chinese. 
In June of 2007, during a Security Council discussion on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin spoke of the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the ability of the AU troops working very hard in the 
region. He then stated, “while the responsibility for the protection of civilians falls first 
and foremost on the Governments of States where conflict is occurring, we believe that 
such responsibility should also be kept in mind by other parties that might be drawn into 
various conflict situations.”472 Continuing the same emphasis from Russian government 
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officials prior to the 2005 UN World Summit, the ambassador emphasized the primacy of 
the Security Council. Mr. Churkin ended by saying, “the Security Council is fully 
justified in paying greater attention to the protection of civilians as part of its 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security.”473 
When discussing the protection of civilians during armed conflict, Chinese 
Ambassador Li Junhua stated that R2P had to be carefully understood and applied 
correctly. He noted that “at present, there are still differing understandings and 
interpretations of this concept among Member States.” The Chinese ambassador 
suggested the Council refrain from invoking the concept of R2P. He instructed the 
Security Council to “respect and support the General Assembly in continuing to discuss 
the concept in order to reach a broad consensus.”474 
D. SUPPORTERS OF R2P SINCE THE 2005 WORLD SUMMIT 
DECLARATION 
The emergence of the norm of R2P has continued to make progress since the 2005 
World Summit Declaration. Evans notes that “of all the regional organizations capable of 
helping make R2P a reality, the twenty-seven-member EU brings by far the greatest 
potential strengths.”475 He describes the EU’s strengths as its population and wealth 
along with its economic and diplomatic interconnectedness. Furthermore, the author 
states that since the emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 
“the EU has been increasingly focused on developing an integrated set of strategies for 
conflict prevention and management.”476  
Evans is just as optimistic in his discussion of the AU and its willingness and 
ability to continue the thrust of the norm of R2P. Emphasizing the exception to the non-
interference principle in the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000, he notes the Union’s plans to 
                                                 
473 Statement of Ambassador V. Churkin of Russia, 
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=417 (accessed 
November 12, 2008). 
474 Ibid.  
475 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 183. 
476 Ibid. 
 112
build an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. The force, “with five regional brigades of 
3,000 to 4,000 troops each, [provides] the AU with a combined standby capacity of 
15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers and a wide range of identified potential mission, from 
advice and observation to full-scale intervention.”477  
The African Standby Forces and the EU’s battlegroups exemplify a planned 
willingness to deploy troops in harm’s way to in the effort to save strangers from being 
persecuted or endangered by their own governments. As recently as November 1, 2008, 
The Irish Times in an article titled “EU Battlegroup Must be Deployed to Conflict in 
Congo” commented, “On paper, the EU is ready and equipped to respond to this type of 
urgency. EU battlegroups now exist, but have never been used.”478 The article continues 
to state “their purpose is to respond to requests from the UN to undertake rapid 
intervention in a hostile environment, including support for the provisions of urgent 
humanitarian aid.”479 This final section will highlight actions by the international 
community, primarily the UN, to continue to strengthen the norm of R2P. 
Less than a year after the 2005 UN World Summit Declaration and the General 
Assembly’s landmark adoption of the principles of R2P—namely sovereignty as a 
responsibility—the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1674, stating the UN 
“reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”480 The Resolution also commits the 
Security Council to action to protect civilians in armed conflict, while “expressing its 
deep regret that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in situations of armed 
conflict.”481  
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Resolution 1674 has since been used by statesmen and UN ambassadors to 
promote the norm of R2P. In a subsequent UN Security Council open debate Ambassador 
Gerhard Pfanzelter of Austria, speaking on behalf of the EU, collectively identified the 
World Summit, R2P and UNSC 1674 in an effort to emphasize the need of the UN to 
protect civilians. Pfanzelter stated: 
At the World Summit 2005 our Heads of State and Government 
underlined that of civilians in armed conflict is a concern of the 
international community. A number of important decisions and 
commitments have been taken. Most important was the historic agreement 
on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which has been reaffirmed 
by SC Resolution 1674.482 
At the same debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, ambassadors 
representing Denmark, Slovakia, Great Britain, and Slovenia emphasized their support 
and reminded the audience of the 2005 UN World Summit Declaration and the 
subsequent Security Council Resolution 1674. Slovenian Ambassador, Mr. Roman Kim 
took the argument even further when he reminded the Security Council that, “the 
responsibility to protect is a continuum that ranges from prevention to protection and 
rebuilding.”483  
African and Latin American nations reinforced R2P and Resolution 1674 at the 
Security Council open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Ghanaian 
Ambassador Leslie Kojo Christian noted that the adoption of Resolution 1674 
demonstrates the Security Council’s determination to take appropriate measures to 
counter gross violations of human rights to include genocide, ethnic cleansing, as well as 
sexual exploitation and abuse. He continues to reinforce the position that responsibility 
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for the protection of civilians resides first with the host country.484 Ambassador from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo Itoua Apoyolo ended his remarks by stating “I cannot 
conclude without recalling the idea of the responsibility to protect, . . . We strongly 
support that idea, for it is up to the parties of the conflict to guarantee access for 
humanitarian personnel to populations in need.”485 At the debate, Ambassador Garcia 
Moritan of Argentina gave a lengthy exhortation on continuing to support the principles 
of R2P. He concluded by stating: 
In the case of the protection for civilians, the consideration of a 
mechanism of this nature could also mean an initial step regarding the 
implementation of the final part of paragraph 138 of the Outcome 
Document of the 2005 Summit that indicates that the international 
community must support the United Nations to establish an early warning 
capability regarding the responsibility to protect.486 
But the Chinese ambassador expressed caution and as in previous debates, 
suggested continued discussion. Ambassador Liu emphasized that, in China’s view, 
Resolution 1674: 
Reaffirmed a principle expressed in the outcome document of last year’s 
summit: the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. China believes that 
that is not the same as the simple concept of the responsibility to protect, 
about which many countries continue to have concerns. The outcome 
document elaborated extensively on the concept. In-depth discussion of 
the issue should continue in the General Assembly so that differing 
opinions can be heard and doubts cleared up. In that role, the Security 
Council cannot and should not replace the General Assembly.487 
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He suggested continued debate and discussion by the General Assembly; he, 
however, did not suggest giving up the principle role of the Security Council of 
determining when to authorize the use of force. Furthermore, Ambassador Liu did imply 
that the UNSC should not make a decision in regards to R2P, as it might be interpreted as 
a legal precedent. 
The next major push of the norm of R2P, by member states of the UN, was during 
the third UN Security Council open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict 
on June 22, 2007. During the discussion, the Belgian ambassador reiterated the principles 
of R2P and pressed even further noting the “international community has the 
responsibility—and even the duty—to respond.”488 British Ambassador Karen Pierce 
reinforced these words by also stating “While national Governments have the primary 
responsibility to protect their citizens, the international community also has 
responsibilities. We should live up to them.”489 The German Ambassador, on behalf of 
the European Union, succinctly stated “at the 2005 World Summit the Heads of States 
established the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. The EU welcomes the reaffirmation of the 
responsibility to protect by the Security Council in subsequent resolutions, including 
resolution 1674.”490 The Italian, Liechtenstein, and Slovakian ambassadors reiterated the 
view of their EU spokesperson.  
From Sub-Saharan Africa, the Ghanaian ambassador expressed a desire to commit 
to the principles of R2P. Speaking for Nigeria, Ambassador Aminu Wali also very 
explicitly supported the norm of R2P, while noting the international community still 
needs to come to a common ground on the use of armed intervention. Ambassador Wali 
stated: 
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We believe that the time has come for the international community to 
reexamine when it is its responsibility to protect civilians, without 
prejudice to the sovereignty of Member States. The genocide in Rwanda, 
the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and the crimes committed against unarmed 
civilians in areas of conflict, especially in Africa serves [sic]as a constant 
reminder that we have to search for a generally acceptable understanding 
when the international community exercises its responsibility to protect.491 
The ambassadors from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo noted the role of 
the UN 2005 World Summit Declaration in the continued emphasis on R2P. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has offered a closer examination of the struggle for adoption of the 
principles of R2P in the Summit Document and the key players and states in its eventual 
adoption. The norm of R2P has entered the final stage of the norm life cycle for some but 
not all states, and it has not reached what Finnemore and Sikkink describe as a “taken-
for-granted” quality nor is it fully internalized.492  
Support for the norm is still emerging. For example, Italian Ambassador to the 
UN, Marcello Spatafora, in May 2008, called Resolution 1674 a “cardinal achievement” 
and stated “we must never lose sight of the fact that what matters most at the end of the 
day is if and how we are able to deliver and have an impact on the ground in bringing 
relief to those who suffer.”493 In the concluding chapter, the thesis will demonstrate that 
the nation most capable of promoting and convincing the international community to 
internalize the norm of R2P—the United States—lost sight of the need to bring relief to 
those who suffer. The concluding chapter will demonstrate the arguments from scholars 
that the so-called Global War on Terror and subsequent invasion of Iraq had removed the  
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material capability and the will of the current Bush administration to support the R2P 
norm and give it that taken-for-granted quality as described by Finnemore and Sikkink in 
the third and final stage of the norm life cycle. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has sought to use the process of articulation to investigate the norm 
emergence of humanitarian intervention. It has argued that a norm of humanitarian 
intervention exists. Furthermore, using the terminology from Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
three stages of the “norm life cycle,” it has argued that the norm has passed from the first 
stage—norm emergence—through the second stage—norm cascade—and has entered the 
third stage—norm internalization. 
This thesis has demonstrated that humanitarian intervention, multilateral or 
unilateral is not a new phenomenon or just a phenomenon of the 1990s. Humanitarian 
grounds were offered in cases of nineteenth century intervention by European powers in 
order to protect fellow Christians being persecuted by the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Next, 
the continuation of the emergence of the norm is illustrated in the Cold War cases of 
humanitarian intervention that ended genocidal atrocities, and which were justified on the 
basis that the use of force was the only means of ending atrocities on a massive scale.494 
During the Cold War, the bipolarity of the international system allowed for a “relatively 
strong agreement that the way they treated their citizens was a domestic matter” and that 
interference from another state was “a significant violation of sovereignty.”495 The end of 
the Cold War, however, allowed for states to view the internal aggression of state 
behavior as an indicator of external policy. As demonstrated after the post-Cold War, 
what were once considered atrocities or genocide were now characterized as threats to 
international peace and security. The 2005 World Summit Declaration emphasized that 
the humanitarian intervention must include a multilateral force authorized by the UN 
Security Council to be determined as legitimate by international society.496 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that three key aspects are necessary for 
internalization of a norm: its legitimation, prominence, and intrinsic characteristics. This 
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process and these features are demonstrated through the pronouncements of leaders of 
certain states or governmental organizations. For example, when the German 
Ambassador to the UN speaks on behalf of the EU stating support for the norm of the 
responsibility to protect, the norm gains legitimation and prominence. The same holds 
true for the African nations when their AU representative speaks on their behalf in 
support of the norm of the responsibility to protect. For these states in particular, that 
have seen substantial unwelcomed intervention in the last century, it is significant that the 
AU Charter specifically addresses a right of intervention in grave circumstances to stop 
“war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”497  
Legitimation, prominence, and the intrinsic characteristics of the norm are 
elevated by media events. For example, in January 2008 the former UN Secretary-
General Annan received recognition for his tireless efforts to promote the norm of 
sovereignty as a responsibility not just a right. In January 2008, Annan, already a Nobel 
Peace Prize recipient, became the first recipient of the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation Award for International Justice. When presenting the award, the 
Foundation President, Mr. Jonathon Fanton, recapped some of Annan’s work, citing “It 
was under his leadership as Secretary General at the United Nations that the International 
Criminal Court was established and the Responsibility to Protect became an accepted 
principle for international action in face of the worst human suffering.” Fanton continued, 
“These critical building blocks of an effective international justice system form a legacy 
that will benefit the world for generations to come.”498 
The norm of humanitarian intervention or R2P has entered, even if ever so 
slightly, the third stage of norm internalization for a significant number of countries: 
Canada, the countries of the European Union, and the majority of the countries of the 
African Union. In addition, the norm of humanitarian intervention has been combined 
with a similar, but not entirely the same, norm of sovereignty as a responsibility. This  
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norm of sovereignty as a responsibility, entrepreneured most prominently by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has become familiarly known as the responsibility to 
protect or R2P.  
The norm emergence and internalization of R2P has not, however, taken hold in 
some other countries and regions, namely the United States, Russia, China, most of South 
Asia and parts of Latin America. There are a number of reasons for this lack of 
internalization, as described in Chapter VI, including suspicions and fears of the 
powerful’s self-interested abuse of intervention, and the demand to uphold the norm of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. Russia and China hold fast to the primacy of the UN 
Security Council to authorize the use of force. The United States does not want a set 
criteria for the use of force for humanitarian intervention that could possibly compel it 
into action. Furthermore, the United States holds firm to the notion that if the Security 
Council is at loggerheads (as in the case Kosovo) with the support of the international 
community, the United States will not be held back from acting unilaterally through a 
regional security organization, such as NATO. 
Yet, the fact that the United States, Russia, China, and a number of developing 
countries were able to find common ground to adopt the principles of R2P unanimously, 
is a monumental step for the emergence of the norm. The adoption of the principles of 
R2P pushed the norm marginally further for these countries while opening the door to the 
third stage of the norm life cycle—norm internalization—for Canada, the EU and most 
AU countries.  
A. INCOMPLETE INTERNALIZATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT AND DARFUR 
Given the current condition of the norm of R2P, how will the international 
community react to genocide? How will the international community answer the question 
that Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked the UN General Assembly in April 2000, when 
he stated, “if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations 
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of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”499 The remainder 
of this concluding chapter will consider the current crisis in Darfur to demonstrate briefly 
where the norm of R2P currently stands and how far the norm has developed. 
In addition to the difficulty the five members of the UN Security Council have 
had in finding agreement on armed intervention for humanitarian reasons and now on 
R2P, scholars note another challenge to securing the political will for intervention: the 
preoccupation with combating terrorism that arose after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, on the United States. The U.S. and U.K. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq 
diminished the political support for R2P principles in their respective countries.500 What 
might have been a desire by those countries most in favor of R2P, such as Canada, Great 
Britain, Norway and Japan, and a humanitarian response to ongoing atrocities, such as 
those in Darfur, was “quickly replaced by a new Western preoccupation and strategic 
focus on combating terrorism.”501 Weiss observes: 
The wars in Iraq and on terror have had three stifling effects on the 
normative conversation. [. . .] Iraq is a conversation stopper for many 
critics when discussing any possible loosening of criteria for intervention 
or setting aside the principle of non-intervention. Second, glib rhetoric 
about the wars on Iraq and terrorism suggests a heightened necessity for 
more clear-headed analysis. There is a danger of contaminating the 
legitimate idea of humanitarian intervention by association, especially 
with George W. Bush’s and Tony Blair’s spurious and ex post facto 
“humanitarian” justification for invading Iraq.502 
Furthermore, the U.S. war in Iraq has had an equally detrimental effect on the drive to 
encourage developing nations to overcome their suspicions about R2P. Weiss argues that 
the “sloppy and disingenuous use of “the h word” by Washington and London has played 
into the hands of those Third World countries that wish to slow or reverse normative 
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progress.”503 Nicholas Wheeler and Justin Morris note that because Iraq is interpreted in 
“wider international society as a case of abuse, this would make it much more difficult to 
persuade other governments to support future interventions justified in humanitarian 
terms.”504 
However, despite the negative effects of the Iraq war, many scholars still 
emphasize the progress of the development of the R2P norm.505 The continued 
emergence of the norm thus far “has been remarkable considering the lingering and 
pervasive mood of inter-state bitterness within the UN that was spawned by the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.”506 A June 2008 British House of Commons study states: 
While [R2P’s] global endorsement in 2005 was a major political 
achievement, its legacy remains uncertain. The commitment of the 
international community to put pen to paper at the World Summit in 2005 
has contributed significantly to R2P’s normative status, but, crucially, in 
the three years since its adoption, the doctrines’ ability to make an impact 
on the lives of civilians in peril remains untested. [. . .] The question 
remains, therefore, whether the laudable efforts of world leaders in 2005 
to forge consensus on the R2P will be translated into a workable reality.507 
The non-operationalization of the norm of R2P is evident in the international 
community’s response to the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. R2P is 
not a fully internalized norm, and Darfur highlights this status of the norm. 
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The current Darfur humanitarian crisis began in 2003 as the civil war in Sudan, 
between its Arab Muslim north and Black Christian south, was coming to an end through 
the UN negotiate Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Sudan expressed fear of U.S. 
intentions regarding intervention, expressed in U.S. political rhetoric regarding a Chapter 
VII UN authorization to use force against the Sudanese-backed militias.508 Their rhetoric 
invoked parallels between NATO “saving” Kosovo Albanians and UN troops “saving” 
Darfur. NATO, under a humanitarian agenda, intervened militarily in Kosovo in 1999, 
paving the way for Kosovo to declare independence in 2008. De Waal states that the U.S. 
was openly supportive of Kosovar independence and it also offered military training to 
the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), “many of whose members support 
the secession of southern Sudan in the referendum scheduled for 2011 in accordance with 
the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA).”509  
For similar reasons, MacFarlane notes that the humanitarian terms used by the 
U.S. and its coalition partners as justification for their invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq discredited the altruism of the U.S. and the international community’s 
intentions regarding future attempts to intervene in cases of human rights violations even 
in cases of genocide.510 Moreover, the political will of the United States and the United 
Nations to act in humanitarian emergencies in places such as Darfur or other regions of 
Africa “has evaporated because of their obsession with Iraq and the war on terror.”511  
Unfortunately, this suggests that strategic requirements will most likely trump the 
norm of humanitarian intervention, in Africa and other locations of need, when the two 
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concerns—strategic requirements and human suffering—collide. Emphasizing atrocities 
from Rwanda to Darfur, Gareth Evans, co-author of the ICISS’s R2P report, cites the 
poorly and inconsistently argued humanitarian rationalizations for the invasion of Iraq 
and states that these actions “almost choked at birth what many were hoping was an 
emerging new norm justifying intervention on the basis of the principle of ‘responsibility 
to protect.’”512 Specifically referring to the ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Cherly Igiri and 
Princeton Lyman note that “there is clear evidence that the Sudanese government linked 
American activism in Darfur with its actions in Iraq, portraying it both as oil-oriented and 
anti-Islamic, and that this strategy helped to reinforce African and Middle Eastern 
hostility to the idea of Western enforcement.”513 Lastly, if the credibility of the states and 
institutions most associated with the notion of “Responsibility to Protect” is undermined 
by the perception of the norm’s use only for self-serving purposes, the process of 
normative advancement and acceptance is most likely to be slowed or halted.514 
A further reason why the norm of R2P has failed to garner U.S. and broader 
international support to save those suffering humanitarian atrocities is due to the 
competing interpretations of national interests—especially in relation to Darfur. 
Specifically, if more traditional state interests are perceived to be at stake, such as 
geopolitical ambitions, state security, access to minerals, then the emphasis on human 
rights, to include calls for humanitarian intervention, continue to be relegated to 
secondary interests.515 Grono states this most starkly: “the sad reality is that Darfur 
simply does not matter enough, and Sudan matters too much” for the U.S. and the 
international community to do more to stop the atrocities.516 Russia is a major supplier of 
weapons to Sudan, while China is a major consumer of Sudanese oil. Even in the face of 
international pressure, both Russia and China appear reluctant to reverse their policies, as 
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demonstrated by their reactions to the atrocities in Darfur since 2003.517 The U.S. also 
has strategic interests in Sudan, primarily in its close relationship to intelligence 
gathering in fighting international terrorism. For example, in 2005, the U.S. flew the 
Sudanese chief of intelligence—one of the architects of the Darfur atrocities—to the U.S. 
for meetings with the CIA.518 Darfur all too painfully illustrates that, despite the efforts 
of norm entrepreneurs, states have yet to redefine their national interests in a manner that 
places humanitarianism at their core. 
Wheeler acknowledges that “there is no guarantee that when confronting a 
humanitarian emergency, states would agree that the just cause threshold has been 
crossed.”519 In the absence of a redefinition of U.S. national interests to incorporate 
humanitarianism, aggressive action on the part of the U.S. to stop the crisis in Darfur 
would depend upon the government being persuaded to act by the twin forces of 
international and domestic opinion—aided by the so-called CNN effect. This has not 
been the case for Darfur. Despite tremendous international and domestic pressure—to 
include daily accounts of horrific acts in IDP camps in both Darfur and neighboring 
Chad—the U.S. (and other nations) have resisted the call to take determined action.520 As 
exemplified by the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and again in Darfur in 2003, without a 
redefinition of the national interest that makes humanitarianism a core interest, political 
will becomes the key determinant of action. Lacking the necessary political will to act, 
governments are not guaranteed to surrender to international or domestic pressure to 
intervene in cases of humanitarian emergencies. 
The noted lack of aggressive action of the State Department regarding Darfur 
presents a further example of the norm of R2P not taking hold within the current Bush 
administration. Due to mounting pressure from NGOs and Congress, the U.S. State 
Department in May 2004 commenced an investigation into the human rights violations 
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reported to have occurred in Darfur. The NGOs specifically hoped that labeling the 
atrocities and ethnic cleansing as “genocide” would shame the U.S. into action. The 
advocacy groups only got half of their wish. In September 2004, the investigation 
concluded that the killings in Darfur were indeed “genocide,” which “broadened the 
usage of the term ‘genocide’ to include ethnically targeted killings, rapes and 
displacement perpetrated in the course of counter-insurgency, a significant expansion on 
the customary usage of the term to refer to attempts to eliminate entire populations.”521 
Unfortunately, the State Department then insisted that, despite the United States being a 
state-party of the Genocide Convention, the findings would have no impact upon U.S. 
foreign policy, and furthermore, in no way obligated the U.S. to take any form of 
action.522 
The norm of R2P has not reached the third stage of internalization for a number of 
critical states. But the principles of R2P are likely to continue to make new ground. Its 
greatest challengers, three members of the UN Security Council—the United States, 
China, and Russia–may continue to impede the climb of the norm towards Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s “taken-for-granted” quality. The administration of President-elect Barack 
Obama brings some promise to the norm of R2P. Obama’s running-mate, Senator Joe 
Biden, an avid supporter of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, has been outspoken 
of U.S. and UN failure to do more in support of the genocide in Darfur. Obama’s 
selection of Susan Rice, a human rights scholar with experience in the UN, as his U.S. 
ambassador to the United Nations demonstrates a new direction with greater support of 
R2P.  
Pressure will likely continue to build upon the United States, China, and Russia as 
the norm of R2P becomes internalized by the other states and bodies within the 
international system, especially the UN and regional intergovernmental organizations, 
including the African Union and the European Union. It will undoubtedly be the work of 
these intergovernmental organizations and NGOs to continue to propel the norm of R2P 
forward. 
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